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ABSTRACT 
There is no doubt that the 9/11 attacks constituted a new terrorism phenomena in terms of 
sophistication  and scale of mayhem.    U.S. policy makers had to consider at least three 
approaches in response to these attacks: the criminology or soft power approach, the war 
approach, and the root-causes and the battle of ideas approach. The U.S. pursued a total 
war on terrorism approach not only against al-Qaeda, but also against all other terrorists 
in world. The war approach that utilized the might of the American military against non-
state actors has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives; millions have been 
injured and displaced as well. Yet, despite the war approach, al-Qaeda is still posing a 
great threat to the Unites States and its allies. Additionally, the rate of its attacks against 
American targets is ever-increasing. These facts force us to reexamine the effectiveness 
of the war approach nine years after to its commencement. 
This research examines the effectiveness of the war approach using metrics other 
than body count. It looks at the effect of the war on al-Qaeda’s organizational structure. It 
major finding is that the war on terrorism has forced al-Qaeda to transform its 
organizational structures to al-Qaeda’s advantage. The war helped al-Qaeda’s 
organization to expand horizontally, creating new organizational mergers and affiliates, 
as well as making room for radicalizing aspiring jihadists. The organization has changed 
from a mere terrorist network to a radical social movement with an ideology and a brand 
name that has presence in more than 70 countries. Two new strategies are necessary to 
fight al-Qaeda effectively. First, the U.S. needs to distinguish between al-Qaeda and all 
other types of Islamist activism. The war approach should be limited strictly to fighting 
al-Qaeda alone. Second, the U.S. could benefit from adopting a “hybrid” approach where 
national and international legal cooperation is combined with a root causes and soft-
power approach to separate al-Qaeda from its potential supporters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Nine days after the horrific 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administration officially 
declared a war on terrorism. President George W. Bush articulated its main objective 
during a speech to the U.S. Congress: “The war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it 
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated.”1 Nine years later, it is important to examine the 
effectiveness of the approach taken by the U.S. administration to combat anti-American 
terrorism. Has the war on terrorism achieved its declared objectives? If it has fallen short, 
what explains its limitations and failures? To quote former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, “Are we winning or losing the global war on terror?”2 
There is no doubt that many things have changed in response to the 9/11 attacks. 
These changes have affected individuals, organizations, and states. For individuals, the 
war on terrorism has curtailed some fundamental liberties and may have infringed on 
people’s privacy. Monitoring phone calls, enacting tighter border security procedures, 
and increasing profiling practices, both official and unofficial, have had negative effects 
on individual freedoms.  More importantly, many people have lost their lives and been 
displaced as a consequence of the war on terrorism. The organizational level has 
witnessed the birth of new security institutions, new counterterrorism policies, and the 
emergence of new terrorist entities. Assessing the total positive and negative impacts of 
this war must take into account all of these developments. At the state level, there have 
been regimes change by force as a direct response to the 9/11 attacks, including the 
removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathist state in Iraq. Terrorists have 
targeted some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia,  
 
                                                 
1 CNN.Com, "Transcript of President Bush's Address - September 21, 2001," 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ (accessed Jun 11, 2010).  
2 USATODAY.Com,  http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm 
(accessed Jun 11, 2010). 
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for their support of the global war on terrorism. How one accounts for the impact of the 
global war on terrorism on states allied with U.S. is an important part of assessing the 
successes and failures of this war. 
From the first days of the war on terrorism until now, the official measurements 
of the progress of the war on terrorism lay in numbers and buddy-count metrics. 
Therefore, many cite neutralizing two-third of al-Qaeda operatives either by killing or 
capturing; freezing $ 200 million of al-Qaeda financial assets, and denying al-Qaeda their 
two main safe heavens (Afghanistan and Iraq) as an indication of success that proves the 
effectiveness of the war approach.  This research examines the effectiveness of the war 
on terrorism differently. It examines it in terms of utilizing military forces, through a 
different set of metrics: the “organizational structure metrics”. Accordingly, the research 
core question answered in this thesis is how does the war approach affect the 
organizational structure of al-Qaeda? Is the war on terrorism destroying al-Qaeda, or is it 
rebuilding it in different shape? Central to this inquiry is a study of the history of al-
Qaeda in terms of its establishment dynamics, goal evolution, organizational structure, 
and relations with other terrorist organizations, especially those who merged under its 
banner post-9/11. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Nine years after declaring the global war on terrorism, which commenced with 
the invasion of Afghanistan, it is important to evaluate the progress of the U.S. and its 
allies. Any extended war, with an uncertain end, against an unidentified enemy has 
significant negative implications from security, economic, and social perspectives. 
National security services are now contending with countless asymmetric threats that 
have bloomed dramatically in the last decade. Economic costs are mounting and 
consuming valuable resources. Tensions with the Muslim world have increased and 
intensified the feeling of a civilizational clash between Muslims and the Western world. 
Understanding our progress in fighting terrorism may offer us an opportunity to choose 
alternative policies that can more effectively minimize the threat of terrorism while 
reducing its financial, political, and—above all else—the human costs.  
 3
The threat level currently encountered by our free societies, which is obviously 
greater than the prewar on terrorism era, forced us to restructure our understanding of 
how to measure the progress of fighting terrorism and to evaluate both the effectiveness 
and implications of the war approach.  Buddy-count metrics are paradoxical with the 
reality that suggests al-Qaeda is imposing an imminent and greater threat to the United 
States and its allies than before 9/11.3 Some may ask the legitimate question; how can 
they still pose such a threat?  Haven’t we neutralized two-third of al-Qaeda, frozen most 
of its financial assets, and cleared their major bases? The simple answer is that the U.S. is 
using the wrong metrics of measurement. The organizational structure metrics in this 
research will eliminate this paradox, answer the above question, most importantly, 
question the effectiveness of the war approach. 
C. MAIN HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines the following hypothesis: the war approach was and is not 
the appropriate tool to eliminate terrorism, because it does not promise to solve the 
problem of terrorism. To the contrary, the war on terrorism has helped increase al-
Qaeda’s organizational structure horizontally, as the present organization encompasses 
mergers, affiliates, aspirants, and radicalized individuals.  The organization has diffused 
into groups and cells that operate in more than 70 countries around the world.  It is no 
longer an isolated and vertically structured organization. 
The war on terrorism has not weakened the structure of al-Qaeda. Instead it has 
allowed it to become a more sophisticated and resilient organization. Al-Qaeda, like most 
other terrorist organizations, upon its establishment kept on the classical organizational 
structure. It was a top –down hierarchal organization, and Bin Laden was in control at the 
top. However, since 9/11, Bin Laden has become more of a symbolic figure to the 
organization and less of a controller. As a direct response to the war approach, the 
structure of this organization flipped and became a bottom-up movement, where 
members are voluntarily defending the ideas behind al-Qaeda, but not al-Qaeda itself.  
                                                 
3 John Rollins, “Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for 
US Policy,” Congressional research services, February, 2010, 1. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf (accessed October 19, 2010). 
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Therefore, the killing or capturing of al-Qaeda operatives is not necessarily a good 
indication of the effectiveness of the war on terrorism.  A matrix that analyzes al-Qaeda’s 
organizational structure before and after 9/11 is a far better measure than the “numbers 
metrics”. 
An additional argument of this thesis is that there are no clear signs that United 
States is moving in the right direction in their fight against terrorism.  The war unified the 
jihadists to fight the far enemy instead of the apostate regimes in their respective 
countries. Additionally, many perceive the war on terrorism as an unjustified war against 
Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda has exploited this perception to recruit thousands of Muslim 
youth and win the sympathy of Muslim public.  
D. METHODOLOGY  
This study will use qualitative analysis to assess the effectiveness of utilizing 
military forces in a total war against terrorism. Through a cross-time comparison, it will 
analyze the evolution of the al-Qaeda organization, over the last nine years, by looking at 
its goals, capabilities and relationships and ties with other active terrorists groups in the 
Islamic world. The research will also answer the following questions: How did Al-Qaida 
and other groups emerge?  When have they succeeded and when have they failed? What 
was the nature of relations between the jihadists in the Islamic World? How did other 
jihadist groups perceive Bin Laden’s ideologies before 9/11? Finally, what changes has 
the war on terrorism affected on the organizational structure of al-Qaeda? The research 
will consult literature in English and in Arabic to understand how Arab writers perceive 
the present problem of al-Qaeda and terrorism.  The thesis will focus on analyzing data 
and documents that recall events, testimonies, and opinions of al-Qaeda veterans, 
prisoners and eye- witnesses.  
The research also will examine the number of incidents that have taken place 
before and after September 11 2001, with a focus on al-Qaeda. Specifically, it will track 




United States, to 2001 (or period I), and then from 2001 to 2010 (period II). This analysis 
will use data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) run by the University of 
Maryland consortium for the study of terrorism. 
The thesis also will examine the number of terrorist organizations that have 
publicly associated themselves with al-Qaeda before and after the United States waged 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will analyze three types of al-Qaeda associations: 
mergers, affiliations, and aspirants. Mergers with al-Qaeda signal the highest 
commitment to the terrorist network and are best represented by al-Qaeda’s merger in 
2004 with the Iraq-based Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-al Jihad led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
under the name of Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. Another example is the merger 
between the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and al-Qaeda in 2006, 
under the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Affiliating with al-Qaeda is 
the second-highest form of association. Groups like Al Ittihad Al Islami in Somalia, 
Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines are al-Qaeda 
affiliates that have not officially merged with the group. Al-Qaeda aspirants are the 
weakest associates of the al-Qaeda network, but they represent a phenomenon that 
measures the appeal of the al-Qaeda brand. Examples of this third category include 
homegrown cells in the U.S. and Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The period following the 9/11 attack witnessed a major jump of interest in 
studying terrorism. According to Andrew Silke, who heads the program in terrorism 
studies at the University of East London, “if current trends continue, more than 90% of 
the terrorism studies literature will have been written post-9/11.”4 Silke observes, “[A] 
new book on terrorism is published every six hours in the English language.”5 After the  
 
 
                                                 
4 Quoted in Jessica Shepherd, "Education: Academic Interest: The Rise and Rise of Terrorism 
Studies," The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, sec. Guardian Education Pages, July 3, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/jul/03/highereducation.research (accessed Jun 14, 2010). 
5 Ibid. 
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horrific attack on United States homeland and even before the administration identified 
the perpetrators, the question of how the United States would respond dominated the 
world sphere. 
There are three categories of literature that focus on a state response to terrorism 
and which policy might be the most effective to eliminate it: the criminology approach, 
the war approach, and the root-causes approach. The three approaches are not fully 
distinctive, and they do interact with each other in most cases. However, writers 
obviously focus on a main approach that might find support from another.  
1. The Criminology and Soft Power Approach  
Proponents of this approach insist mainly on three things. First, Bruce Schneier 
argues that states should not make significant changes in response to rare terrorist 
events.6 Second, the United States should not consider the attack “an act of war,” hence 
America should have avoided a military response to the 9/11 attack.  Third, perpetrators 
should be criminalized by the U.S. administration in accordance with the international 
law.  
Several officials in the field of counterterrorism suggest that waging a “war” 
using all means of military force is an inappropriate response. Sir Ken Macdonald, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, argues that “Those responsible for atrocities like the July 
7 bombings in London were not ‘soldiers’ in a war, but ‘deluded’, narcissistic… who 
should be dealt with by the criminal justice system.” 7 He also notes, “The criminal justice 
response to terrorism must be ‘proportionate and grounded in due process and the rule of 
law.’”8 In addition, “We must protect ourselves from these atrocious crimes without 
abandoning our traditions of freedom.”9 Ariel Merari also supports this view is and  
 
                                                 
6 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World (New York: 
Copernicus Books, 2003), 11. 
7 Lucy Bannerman, "There is no War on Terror in the UK, Says DPP," The Times, sec. business, 
January 24, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article1295756.ece (accessed Jun 14, 
2010). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
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argues, “Terrorist activity by groups or individuals based within the country against 
which they operate is a criminal matter that can and should be handled by the legal 
system of that country.” 10 
Wybo Heere explains the legality of the war on terrorism. Through his extensive 
research in international law as it relates to international terrorism he concludes:  
The main treaties relating to the conduct of international armed conflict 
are formally and fully applicable to counter-terrorist military operation 
only when those operations have an inter-state character. Where counter-
terrorist operations are simply part of a civil war, the parties must apply, 
as a minimum, the rules applicable to civil wars. Where operations are 
simply part of a state’s policing, and not part of an armed conflict such as 
to bring the laws of war into play, the laws of war are not formally in 
force…. The attempt can and should nevertheless be made to apply the 
law to the maximum extent possible.11   
Others, like Michel Chossudovsky, who is an anti-war activist and economic 
specialist, delegitimize the war on terrorism and argue that it is part of a preplanned 
“military-road map driven by economic agendas, opening up of new economic frontiers 
and the remolding of national economies. The powers of Wall Street, the Anglo-
American oil giants and the U.S.-U.K. defense contractors are indelibly behind this 
process.”12 He also argues that, in order to achieve this agenda, the Bush administration 
twisted and manipulated the truth through a massive media propaganda campaign to build 
a consensus ratified by the judicial branch and galvanize American citizens to support the 
war and legitimize changes. 13 
Although using military force may have a positive impact on mitigating terrorist 
threats in the short-term, it can lead to a clash between Muslims and the west in long run. 
Saighal Vinod points this out in his book Dealing with Global Terrorism: the Way 
                                                 
10 Ariel Merari, "Deterring Fear: Government Responses to Terrorist Attacks," All Business, January 1 
2002, 1, http://www.allbusiness.com/buying_exiting_businesses/3580584-1.html (accessed Jun14, 2010). 
11 Wybo P. Heere, ed., Terrorism and the Military: International Legal Implications (Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser, The Hague, 2003), 91. 
12 Michel Chossudovsky, "The Anglo-American War of Terror: An Overview," Global Research, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=1576&context=va (accessed Jun 14, 2010). 
13 Ibid. 
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Forward where he argues, “The American anger should have abated to a considerable 
extent.”14 He also argues, “Concomitant with the efforts underfoot for coordination and 
streamlining the fight against global terrorism on an international basis, the limits to 
counter-terrorism have also to be appreciated by law makers, law enforcers and the public 
at large.” 15 Steve Hewitt answers the fundamental question, what is the appropriate state 
response to the violence? He argues, “There are short-term and long-term approaches to 
take. The short-term will invariably be dominated by laws, crackdowns and an emphasis 
on the role to be played by police forces and intelligence services. The long-term require 
greater government participation…then negotiations may be the path to follow.” 16 
2. The War Approach 
There is no doubt that the catastrophic event of 9/11 ignited the flames of hatred 
and anger that not only promoted the administration and decision makers to adopt 
policies that turned the world upside down, but also promoted writers, journalists, and 
media to beat the drums of war. Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York, said to the 
United Nations General Assembly, 1 October 2001: 
Look at that destruction, that massive, senseless, cruel loss of human life, 
then I ask you to look in your hearts and see there is no room for neutrality 





                                                 
14 Vinod Saighal, Dealing with Global Terrorism: The Way Forward (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers 
Private Limited, 2003), 8. 
15 Ibid., 218. 
16 Hewitt Steve., the British War on Terrorism: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front 
since 9/11 (London; New York: Continuum: Cromwell Press, Ld., 2008), 119. 
17 EMediaMillWorks, "Giuliani at the United Nations," Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/giulianitext_100101.html 
(accessed Jun 15, 2010). 
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Even at the public level, the desire for revenge was obvious from President 
Bush’s job approval.  In September 21–22, 2001, the president got 90 percent voter 
approval for the way he was doing his job, while in August 24–26 of the following year, 
voter approval dropped to just 55 percent.18   
Five days after the 9/11 attack, the U.S Congress overwhelmingly passed the use 
of force resolution, which gave the President of United States power to use military force 
and whatever means necessary to respond to the 9/11 attack. It also provided a $40 billion 
emergency spending package.19 
Journalists and news reporters played a vital role in promoting war the approach, 
especially those who wrote within the first month of the attack. According to Christopher 
Kelley and Maria Martinez, “A total of 95 articles [on the editorial page of The 
Washington Post] dealing specifically with the war on terrorism were written between 
9/11/01 and 10/7/01, the day United States troops were committed to battle. Fifty-nine 
percent of those editorials (56/95) were written in a tone that was pro-war.”20 On the 
second day after the 9/11 tragedy, Charles Krauthammer advocated “war” as the right 
response to the attack and criticized those who called for the role of justice as a response 
saying: “This is not crime. This is war….Secretary of State Colin Powell's first reaction 
to the day of infamy was to pledge to ‘Bring those responsible to justice.’ This is exactly 
wrong.”21 Some commentators went beyond advocating “war,” criticized the United 
Nations, and delegitimized its ability to facilitate cooperation under international law. 
Richard Salsman, who is an author of several economic books, argued. “It is not the US 
                                                 
18 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, "Do You Approve Or Disapprove of the Way George W. Bush is 
Handling His Job as President," USA Today, sec. news, May 20, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/01132003.htm (accessed Jun15, 2010). 
19 CNN.com, "Congress Approves Resolution Authorizing Force," Cable News Network LP, LLLP, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/congress.terrorism/ (accessed Jun 15, 2010,). 
20 Maria Martinez and Christopher Kelley, "Hitting Camels in the Butt: War Rhetoric and Deliberation 
in the Aftermath of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks" the American Political Science Association, 
August 29-September 1, 2002, , 
http://www.apsanet.org/~polcomm/APSA%20Papers/Kelley%20and%20Martinez.pdf (accessed Jun 15, 
2010). 
21 Charles Krauthammer, "to War, not to Court," The Washington Post, Sec. Columnists, September 
12, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=digest&contentId=A14320-2001Sep11 (accessed Jun 15, 2010). 
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war effort but its irrational appeasement effort that lacks moral legitimacy. The United 
Nations is an evil agency, which harbors terrorist nations and prevents good regimes from 
vanquishing evil ones. The United Nations' building should be emptied at once and filled 
with office space for rational business activity.”22  
John Yoo, who worked in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of 
Justice from 2001to 203, exemplifies those who promoted the war approach and 
marginalized the role of law in confronting terrorism. Five years after leaving his official 
job in the Department of Justice and despite the fact that he had been a subject of 
criticism, he still argues that America is at war and that a criminal approach can’t solve 
the problem. He claims it’s because of the aggressive polices of the administration, al-
Qaeda is no longer the threat it once was.23  He says, “Bipartisan studies of the failings 
that led up to 9/11 refer to the inadequacy of the criminal justice approach to deal 
effectively with an ideologically motivated military organization like al-Qaeda. If 9/11 
started a war…the United States can employ its war powers to kill enemy operatives and 
their leaders, detain them without trial until the end of the conflict.”24 
Brigadier General Russell Howard (ret.) argues, “The Bush administration has no 
choice but to use the military force.”25 According to Howard, “Westphalian rules don’t 
apply when dealing with al-Qaeda and the normal means of influence are not applicable 
when dealing with them, as well.”26 
Shortly after the 9/11 attack, it became clear that the United States was raising the 
notion of war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Soon, this notion led to  
 
                                                 
22 Richard Salsman, "US War on Iraq is Morally Legitimate," Capitalism Magazine, 20 March 2003, 
http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/world/united-nations/2582-War-Iraq-Morally-Legitimate.html 
(accessed Jun 15, 2010). 
23 John Yoo, War by Other Means: an Insider’s Account of the War on Terrorism, (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 231–232. 
24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Howard Russell, Reid Sawyer Howard Russell, ed., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: 
Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations, 2nd ed. ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: 
McGraw Hill Contemporary Learning Series, 2006), 433. 
26 Ibid., 433.  
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actions. On October 7, 2001, U.S. armed forces started a military operation against 
Afghanistan as a direct response to the 9/11 attack. Two years later, the U.S. invaded Iraq 
as part of its continuing global war on terrorism.  
3. Root-Causes and the Battle of Ideas Approach 
In answering the fundamental question, “What can be done to eliminate terrorism 
and bring peace to nations?” or more specifically “How can we fight terrorism?” a third 
approach emerged that advocates policies that deal directly and effectively with the root-
causes of terrorism. It concentrates on the ideological dimensions and ideas more than 
those that just focus on the construction and organizational ones. Byman Daniel argues, 
al-Qaeda is winning the battle of ideas so far. If we do nothing to counter al-Qaeda 
ideology, the movement will gain a steady stream of recruits, and will find refuge among 
sympathetic populations.27  
Rohan Gunaratna argues that the overall result of the operational counterterrorism 
approach is modest, thus investment should go to the strategic counterterrorism approach 
based on soft-power responses: ideological, educational, financial, media, legislative, 
informatics, and developmental responses.28 In general, proponents of this approach 
focus on investigating the root-causes that drive an individual or an organization to adopt 
violence against civilian targets. Upon identifying those causes, the United States or any 
affected state should work seriously to root out these cases by focusing more on long-
term strategies. In the al-Qaeda case, which is the main subject of this thesis, the 
literature revolves around identifying the three main root-causes that created the group 
and helped it recruit more individuals.  
The unsolved Palestinian issue and the biased American support for Israel at the 
expense of Palestinian rights constitutes the first and the most important cause that al- 
 
                                                 
27 Byman Daniel, the Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, New Jersey: 
John Wiley& Sons, Inc., 2008), 45-46. 
28 Rohan Gunaratna, "Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward," in Terrorism: What’s Coming 
the Mutating Threat, ed. Ellis James (Oklahoma City: Memorial Institution for the Prevention of Terrorism, 
2007), 64. 
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Qaeda has used in its recruitment poster. Byman argues that a withdrawal of U.S forces 
from the Gulf area and a fair policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could hinder 
al-Qaeda recruitment efforts.29  
The second cause is the massive American military presence in the Middle East 
and the poorly justified invasion of Iraq. Sherifa Zuhur recommended that U.S strategy 
should carefully “consider the impact of [its] foreign policy in the [Middle East]. The 
Palestinian issue, [America’s] relationship with Israel, and [their] long-term [interest] in 
Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to be used as evidence of [pervasive American 
hypocrisy].”30  
The third cause ranges from the humiliation of to hate crimes against Muslims, 
and from the promotion of tyranny to undermine democratic transformation in some 
Muslim countries. Colonel Laurence Andrew Dobrot argues, “[US] foreign policy has 
created a credibility gap in the Middle East and globally, especially in Muslim populated 
countries. This gap has been created by the perceived hypocrisy of America’s words 
compared to its deeds. The U.S. government talks about promoting democratic principles, 
yet the Muslim countries in the Middle East with which the United States has positive 
relations are either monarchies or dictatorships.”31 Hence, he argues that the U.S should 
re-establish credibility and promote democracy that the Islamic world understands and 
respects. To do so, “[it] must hold the Israelis, the Saudis, the Egyptians, and itself 
accountable to standards, and [it] must recognize democratically elected governments 
such as Hamas and actively engage them in public diplomacy, even if it disagrees with 
them.”32  
Charles Hauss argues, “Force alone will not bring terrorism to an end. To do that, 
we need to use the tools which conflict resolution professionals have been developing 
                                                 
29 Byman Daniel, the Five Front War: the Better way to Fight Global Jihad, (Hoboken, New Jersey, 
John Wiley& Sons, Inc., 2008), 10. 
30 Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency, (US 
Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 60. 
31 Laurence Dobrot, the Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War? (Pennsylvania: US Army War 
College, [2007]), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=822 (accessed Jun 
15, 2010). 8. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
 13
during the last generation or so and address the root cause of terrorism: empathic 
listening, reframing, dialogue, analytical problem solving, coalition-building, among 
others.”33 Howard Zinn argues, “The continued expenditure of more than $300 billion for 
the military every year has absolutely no effect on the danger of terrorism. If we want 
security, we will have to change our posture in the world—to stop being an intervention 
military power and to stop dominating the economies of other countries.”34 
F. OVERVIEW 
This research will examine the effect of the global war on terrorism on al-Qaeda 
since its declaration nine years ago. The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first 
chapter will present the main research question, methodology, and a brief review of 
related literature.  The second chapter will focus on analyzing the history of al-Qaeda and 
other contemporary organizations. This will includes the establishment phase of al-
Qaeda, and other violent groups currently in the Muslim Arab world, their goals, and the 
nature of their relations before the 9/11 era.   
The third chapter will describe the failure of the jihadists’ efforts to achieve their 
objectives at local levels. The importance of this chapter is to shed light on why these 
organizations failed at the local level. Hence, counterterrorism strategy should focus on 
how to bring these organizations back to the stage where recruitment was limited to 
radicals and where a Muslim public perceived the groups’ actions as an act of terror. In 
addition, the third chapter will examine the ideological and structural evolution of al-
Qaeda after the mid-1990s (the consolidation phase). Additionally, the research will 
focus on how other jihadist groups perceived Bin Laden’s escalations, especially after al-
Qaeda’s consolidation.  The U.S. could have exploited other jihadists’ opposition to Bin 
Laden’s projects after 1998, if their policy differentiated between al-Qaeda and Others. 
The fourth chapter will examine how the war on terrorism is serving Bin Laden 
more than hurting him. Failure to understand the difference between al-Qaeda and those 
                                                 
33 Charles Hauss, "Terrorism," Beyond Intractability.org, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/terrorism/ (accessed Jun 15, 2010). 
34 Anthony Arnove, ed., Terrorism and War: Howard Zinn, A Seven Stories Press 1st ed. (New York: 
Seven Stories Press, 2002), 9. 
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who are “not al-Qaeda” contributed to the fusion of “not al-Qaeda” into al-Qaeda. 
Additionally, Chapter IV will discuss the al-Qaeda’s new organizational structure and 
analyze its mergers, affiliates, and aspirants.  Moreover, in this chapter will discuss how 
the world in general and Muslims in particular perceive the war on terrorism, and how 
this perception facilitates terrorist recruitment and fails to delegitimize al-Qaeda 
narrations.  The final chapter will summarize the research findings and offer some 




II. THE AFGHAN WAR AND THE BIRTH OF AL QAEDA 
A. JIHADISM BEFORE AL QAEDA 
It is a simple fact that current events are associated with the past dynamics, hence 
understanding the past contributes to a better understanding of the current situation and 
consequently affects our way of mapping the future.  With that in mind, the present al-
Qaeda threat is a product of dynamics from the late 1960s and 1970s in the Muslim 
world.  The present jihadist movement did not emerge unexpectedly. It is actually a 
continuation of events often called the third wave of the Islamic movements. This wave 
emerged as a response to the failure of the nationalism project to free the holy lands of 
Palestine from the Israeli occupation. The 1967 Arab war with Israel disappointed the 
Islamic publics in general and Arabs in particular. Instead of freeing Palestine, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Syria, they had lost Sinai, the west bank, and Golan respectively. The war 
produced a sense of national and Islamic anger that surfaced during Sadat’s tenure. Sadat 
sought peaceful relations with the United States and Israel, and his actions contributed to 
the emergence of two main radical groups: al-Jihad group and the Islamic group (Al-
Gama'a al-Islamiyah). 
The 1979 peace treaty with Israel was a manifesto, which in the eyes of the 
Islamic public, sacrificed Palestine and killed the hope of its return to the Palestinians. In 
Iran, the success of the 1979 Islamic revolution spurred other Islamic movements in the 
Arab World to pursue the overthrow their apostate regimes and establish Islamic states 
the way that Iran did.  In addition, in 1979, the Soviet “Red Army” had invaded the poor-
isolated-Muslim country of Afghanistan. The United States perceived this invasion, 
which occurred at the peak of the Cold War era, as a strategic threat to its interests. 
Muslim countries, especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, perceived the invasion as 
political threat to their existence. However, the Islamic public perceived the invasion as a 
religious war between communism and Islam.      
This environment produced a new generation of Islamists. A generation who 
believed that jihad was the only path a Muslim should take to free Muslim lands, not only 
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from its invaders, but also from its apostate regimes.  This generation marked the 
beginning of the violent confrontation between the Islamists and their respective regimes, 
of which the assassination of al-Sadat in 1981 was a part.  In addition, it marked the 
beginning of the global Jihad movement, which we are witnessing today with al-Qaeda.     
B. THE ORIGINS OF AL QAEDA 
Although al-Qaeda as an independent organization emerged in the late eighties, its 
roots go back to the late seventies when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  The 
word al-Qaida (the base) was first used by its founder Osama Bin Laden and his first-line 
Lieutenants in 1988. The word was a reference to the records that contained information 
about the members who joined jihads in Afghanistan from all around the world. It was 
not until 1989 that this word took on meaning for jihad groups in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere.  Burke argues that it was unclear if Bin Laden and his group even called 
themselves al-Qaeda during this era.35   
After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic fighters rushed to 
Afghanistan to support their brothers and fight against the communists. Most Arab 
nations and the U.S. facilitated the infiltration of those fighters. The United States 
supported the mujahedeen in order to deny any communist expansion that would threaten 
oil recourses had the Soviet Union reached the Arab Gulf through Pakistan. Additionally, 
the U.S. used al-mujahedeen as a proxy to drain the Soviet’s power during the peak of the 
Cold War. Arab countries supported al-mujahedeen for a variety of different reasons. 
First, some Muslim countries, like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, supported al-mujahedeen 
because they fought on their behalf. Second, some countries supported al-Mujahedeen to 
enhance their status in the west by standing with the United States and its allies against 
the Soviet Union, and also to enhance their status in the domestic sphere by showing their 
commitment to defend Muslim countries. Third, other countries found that facilitating the 
travel of al-mujahedeen to Afghanistan was a good opportunity to get rid of the 
troublemakers who carried jihadist ideologies and were determined to fight jihad against 
the regimes in their countries.  
                                                 
35 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 9.  
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Most of those fighters who travelled to Afghanistan arrived without any 
organizational backgrounds. Upon their arrival, they joined the fronts to fight side by side 
with their Afghan brothers, under the leadership of one of the Afghan factions. Abu 
Jomahh al-Ajazaery, one of the earliest Arab fighters to arrive to Afghanistan, claimed 
that there were no more than 15 Arab fighters in Afghanistan in 1984.36  Among the first 
arrivals to Afghanistan were Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, who later 
established Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK) to administrate al-Mujahedeen affairs.  The 
number of fighters started to increase slowly during this time, and by 1986, the total 
number reached about 200.37 In late 1986, Bin Laden established his first independent 
camp in Jaji that he called al-areen wal-maasadah (lion’s den). It was not until then that 
the Arab fighters started working independently of the Afghani fronts.   
During this period, all the jihadist efforts displayed the following characteristics: 
first, the unity of their goals, which was to fight against the Soviet invasion no regard for 
the fundamental ideological differences between the Arab fighters, whether they be 
Salafist, jihadists, or Muslim brotherhood. Second, the Arab mujahedeen worked under 
the direct commands of an Afghani groups. Bin Laden led the first group to work 
independently, and it consisted of 30 fighters.38 Third, the jihad work found support, 
directly or indirectly, from the United States and most of the Arab or Muslim countries. 
At that time, citizens perceived those fighters as heroes, freedom fighters, and legitimate 
resistors battling the Evil Empire. Fourth, most of the individuals who travelled to 
Afghanistan to fight the Soviets were unaware of the different schools of thoughts within 
the Islamic movements in Afghanistan, which started to surface toward the end of the 
1980s.  Table 1 explains the jihadists’ map during this era. 
                                                 
36 Cameel Altaweel, al-Qaida wa-Akhwateha: Kessat Aljehadeen al-Arab, (Lebanon: Beirut, Dar al-
Saki, 2007), 15. 
37 Ibid., 17. 
38 Ibid., 17. Bin Laden established a small camp during this period, which called al-areen wal-
ma’sadah (the loin’s den) at jajy. In this camp Bin Laden had fought the soviet forces and he achieved a 
great victory over a soviet commandos platoon in 1987. During this battle, Bin Laden sized an assault rifle 
from one of the platoon solders, and this rifle appeared with Bin Laden’s pictures and meetings since that 
battle. 
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Table 1.   Jihadist Map During the Late 1980s 
C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JIHADIST GROUPS THROUGH THE MID-
1990S 
Key events and circumstances took place before the mid 1990s that contributed to 
the formulation of a new map for the jihadists (Table 2). First, the Soviet Army started to 
withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988 and ended its military presence in the country in 
1989. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, the Afghani factions turned on each other, and 
the battle for the authority continued from 1989 until 1996, when the Taliban resolved the 
dispute to its advantage. Second, after Army generals canceled the parliamentary 
elections that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was slated to win, a “Quasi-civil war” 
broke out in Algeria between the political Islamic movements and the Algerian 
forces. Third, General Omar al-Bashir, aided by Hassan al-Turabi (the leader of the 
Islamic movement in Sudan), assumed power through a military coup in Sudan in 1989. 
The new regime had no reservations about embracing Islamic groups in Sudan. 
                                                 
39 Abu Musab al-Suri, “Da’wat al-Moqawmah Al-Islamiyah Al-Alamiah,” 922, Pulpit of Monotheism 
and Jihad, http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=hqkfgsb2, (accessed October 10, 2010). 
Organization name Leadership Goals Component  
Maktab al-Khadamat Abdullah Azzam 
and Bin Laden 
To facilitate al-
mujahedeen 
movements in and out 
Afghanistan 
200 fighter in 1986 
Al-Jihad Sayyed Imam Al-
Sharif 
Fighting against the 
soviet existence in 
Afghanistan   
 
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah  Fighting against the 
soviet existence in 
Afghanistan   
 
Al-afghan al-Arab  Unorganized Fighting against the 
soviet existence in 
Afghanistan   
From all around the 
world, especially from the 
defeated movements in 
the Arab world like 
Egypt, Algeria, and 
Libya.    (total of 40 
thousands fighters)39 
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Fourth, in Somalia, the regime of Mohamed Siad Barrie lost control of the 
country; consequently, the country collapsed and fell into civil war. This anarchic 
environment allowed extremism to flourish and offered an alternative fighting front to the 
Afghani jihadist. Finally, 1991 saw the Gulf War against the Iraqi regime that invaded 
Kuwait in August 1990. The United States led the coalition to expel Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait after the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, refused Bin Laden’s offer to 
fight Saddam Husain with his mujahedeen. Bin Laden saw it as illegal and inappropriate 
to appeal to international forces (infidels) to fight against a Muslim country.    
In addition to the aforementioned circumstances, in 1988 and 1989, the Afghan 
scene witnessed an intellectual dispute among the three major Islamic currents operating 
in Afghanistan (jihadist, Salafist, and Muslim brotherhood). Each of these currents tried 
to recruit as many as it could from the thousands of al-mujahedeen who came to 
Afghanistan without previous organizational alliances. The jihadist map started to change 
dramatically during this time period, driven by the diversity of jihadist goals in the 
absence of the Soviet threat, which unified them previously. Their goals shifted back to 
those of the earlier Afghan era, which was to fight the apostate regimes on national bases.  
Consequently, the period that followed the Soviet withdrawal witnessed the emergence of 
several jihadist movements that pursued nationalist goals with a jihadist means. The most 
important movements that emerged during the late 1980s and early 1990s are as follows: 
al-Qaeda, administrated by Bin Laden; al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha (Armed 
Islamic Group), which emerged in Algeria in 1992; and Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-
Muqatilah bi-Libya (The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group), formed in 1991.  
1. Al-Qaeda  
As the Arab mujahedeen started to reach Afghanistan in large numbers at the end 
of the 1980s, they found that the Jihad for which they had come almost finished. With the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Army in May 1988, the Afghan Arabs, who now numbered in 
the thousands, started to raise questions about what to do and where to go next. Of 
course, they knew that their Jihad in Afghanistan would end one day. However, they had 
no clear concept of what would come next. Would they return to their previous lives as if 
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nothing had happened? Would they continue the jihad? If they did continue, against 
whom would they fight? Some of them, such as Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah and Al-Jihad, 
knew what they wanted to do next.  For these two groups, Afghanistan was just a place to 
train, reorganize, and prepare for the next battle with the regime in their home country. 
For the rest of them, the future was not clear. 
Bin Laden, after some time with the Egyptian al-Jihad members, found himself at 
odds with Abdullah Azzam. Thus, he decided to establish his own organization. In 2002, 
authorities in Bosnia found documents and files titled Tareekh Osama (Osama’s history) 
that been stored on an Islamic charity organization computer.  One of these important 
documents includes a discussion between Bin Laden and one of the founding members of 
al-Qaeda (Abu al-Rida) about the establishment of a new group. In this paper, Bin Laden 
was complaining to Abu al-Rida about his failure to start a new organization or Islamic 
group. One week later, as the documents revealed, Bin Laden held a meeting where he set 
the stage to form the al-Qaeda organization.40   
Structurally speaking, al-Qaeda had no organizational configuration beyond its 
name at that stage; it was more a network that facilitated the jihadists’ efforts in and out 
of Afghanistan. Bin Laden, during this period, was not a leader of jihadists in the way 
that we see him now. He said in his papers, “I am one person.”41 Groups who were 
operating during this period planned their operations unilaterally based on their personal 
perceptions of an operations contribution to their goals’ success; however, Bin Laden’s 
role was to facilitate and to support such operations either financially or in other ways.  
In addition, al-Qaeda did not establish its own distinctive doctrine, which is an 
essential element the formation of an organization, as that would undermine Bin Laden’s 
efforts to administer the network. Bin Laden followed the Wahabbism traditions, some 
followed the classical Salafist lines like the Muslim brotherhood, and others followed the 
Salafist-jihadist or al-salafyah al-jihadiah like al-jihad and al-Islamiyah. These Islamic 
currents never joined together to embrace one of the most important concepts of Jihad, 
                                                 
40 Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda’s Leader (New York: 
Peter Press, 2006), 75–81. 
41 Ibid., 79. 
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which is al-hakimyah (the legitimacy of the Muslim rulers who does not fully implement 
Shariah law and the legality of overthrowing him by force). Therefore, the argument that 
suggests that al-Qaeda was unique and Bin Laden was a powerful figure at the top of an 
organization was capable of projecting its own ideology and doctrine during this phase is 
far from logical.   
2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
The Libyan fighters started to establish their organization—the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG)—in Afghanistan during the early 1990s. After the Soviet Army 
started to withdraw from Afghanistan, the LIFG moved to Sudan, first, to be as close as 
possible to their country and second, to avoid involvement in the dispute between the 
different Afghani factions.  From 1990 to 1995, the organization worked underground. It 
was not until October 1995 that the group announced itself and entered in a direct 
confrontation with the Libyan regime forces.42  
The (LIFG) confined its activities to confrontations with Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, as they considered him an infidel. The (LIFG) pursued its 
goal—to overthrow the regime by force in order to uphold God's law and to establish an 
Islamic state—without getting involved in a bloody confrontation with the Libyan 
society, and without engaging in cross-border alliances. When the organization started to 
lose too many of its members, it changed strategies and targeted the president himself. 
During 1996, the organization attempted two separate assassination attacks against 
President Gaddafi, but fortunately, he survived both of them. 
3. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
In early 1988, the Algerian government launched a series of campaigns against 
Islamic movements in the country.  By that time, Afghanistan had created a relief front  
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where those oppressed peoples could go. Abdullah Azzam’s office, MAK, received 3000 
fighters, and they distributed them over the three main Afghani factions (Hekmatyar, 
Massoud, and Sayyaf).43  
After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, most of the Algerian 
jihadists returned to Algeria. In 1992, the Algerian military establishment stopped the 
second round of Algerian elections and forced President Chadli Bin Jadid to resign. They 
brought former military General, Mohamed Boudiaf, in to serve as president of the State. 
The military regime launched a military campaign to suppress the Islamic Salvation Front 
in early 1992 and ended its great push for the seizure of the state.44 The military 
campaign against the Islamic movements in Algeria focused on the well-known 
intellectual leadership of the Islamic Salvation Front like Abassi Madani and Ali 
BinHadj. Then the regime widened its campaign to include all of the representatives and 
local governors who won the previous election.  
These conditions strengthened the position of the radicals who prompted members 
and supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front to respond violently against the military 
intervention. Consequently, these measures pulled in the moderate Islamic figures and 
contributed to the emergence of unknown radical groups in their place. Therefore, it is 
arguable that the Algerian authority had an indirect and unintentional role in producing 
these radical groups.  
The Algerian-Afghani veterans found a chance to apply their jihad experiences 
from Afghanistan to their home country, since it became clear that Afghanistan was not a 
good choice for them anymore. The Algerian local radical-Salafist goals meshed with the 
returnee radical-jihadist ones; both wanted to uphold God's law and establish an Islamic 
state by overthrowing a tyrannical regime. Moreover, these radical groups exploited the 
oppressive environment to attract Muslims with a more moderate ideology, like the 
Muslim brotherhood in Algeria.  
                                                 
43 Mohammad Mukadam, “The Algerian Afghans from the Group to al-Qaeda Organization,” Al 
Hayat newspaper, November 23, 2001. 
44 Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002’, Congressional 
Research Service: Library of Congress, February 13, 2002), 17,  http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31119.pdf, 
(accessed November 20, 2010). 
 23
The year 1992 witnessed the birth of one of the most radical movements in 
Algeria, called al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha (Armed Islamic Group or GIA). By 
1994, the GIA united 95 percent of the Algerian Islamic movements under its umbrella.  
The GIA became more active and more violent; it has been connected to the bloodiest 
attacks and massacres against civilians, military forces and foreigners. Although the GIA 
had embraced the Algerian “Afghani jihadists” who had close relationships with al-
Qaeda, it refused to establish any significant connection with Bin Laden and his 
organization. Noman Binotman, one of the LIFG leaders claimed that in 1995 a 
delegation associated with the GIA visited Sudan and met with Bin Laden. During the 
meeting, the delegation, led by Abu Baseer, warned Bin Laden not to intervene in the 
Algerian jihadist issue. He threatened Bin Laden by telling him “Whoever dares to 
support any of the Algerian jihadist groups will be beheaded”. Bin Laden told his men, 
“To cooperate with this group is to cooperate with the infidels”.45    
4. Egyptian Jihadist Groups 
The two main Egyptian jihadist groups, like other Islamic groups, tried to 
overthrow the [apostate] regime and establish an Islamic state in its place. Soon after the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan, the Egyptian veterans of the Afghani 
war moved to Sudan. There, established training camps on farms that they bought or 
rented, bought weapons, and prepared themselves for a new confrontation with the 
Egyptian regime.  After the two groups separated from each other, following the 
assassination of President al-Sadat in1981, they each took a separate approach to confront 
the regime.  
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyah, led by the blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel al-Rahman, started 
“to attack tourists and secular [symbols]. The group bombed theaters, bookstores, and 
banks. In 1995, the group allegedly joined forces with the Egyptian terrorist group al-
Jihad in a failed assassination attempt on [President] Mubarak in Addis Ababa, 
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Ethiopia.”46 “In September 1997, [they] killed nine German tourists and their driver in 
front of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. Two months later, the group killed 62 people at a 
tourist site in Luxor. ”47 
Unlike Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah, which was conducting its bloody attacks against 
the government’s main revenue, tourism, al-jihad focused more on attacking targets that 
represented Egyptian authority. In August 1993, they targeted the Egyptian Minister of 
Interior using a suicide bomber. Later, they tried to kill the prime minster in a bomb 
attack.48 The group also attempted to target President Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia, 
but fortunately, he escaped the assassination attempt. On 19 November 1995, the Islamic 
jihad attacked the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, bombing it with two suicide cars. This 
operation came as retaliation against Egyptian intelligence’s use of immoral methods to 
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Table 2.   Jihadist Map from 1989 to mid-1990s 
Organization name Leadership Goals Component  
Al-Qaeda  Bin Laden 1. Fighting communism in 
Yemen 
2. Criticizing the 
American existent in the 
holy lands  
3. Supporting other 
jihadist’s projects. 
Key members from Al-Jihad 
like abu ubidah al- Banshiri 




Jihad (EIJ), Islamic 
Jihad or al-jihad 
Ayman al-
Zawahiri 
Overthrow the Egyptian 
Government(assassination) 
and establish an Islamic 
state  
Educated members, official 






Overthrow the Egyptian 
Government and establish an 
Islamic state by targeting 










Abdelhak Alayada Overthrow the Algerian 
Government and establish an 
Islamic state by targeting 
civilians, military, police, 
tourists, and other moderate 
Islamic movements 
1. Algerian-afghan veterans  
2. Local Salafist 
3. Some members of the  
Islamic Salvation Front 
4. Members of the Islamic 









Overthrow the Libyan 
regime  and establish an 
Islamic state by targeting 
military, police, and 
avoiding any civilian killing  
1. Local Jihadist movements 
2. Libyan-afghan fighters  
3. Libyan al-Qaeda 
members  
D. JIHADISTS’ GOALS  
The jihadists’ goals after the afghan war shifted toward establishing local Islamic 
states that did not exceed their countries borders; each group focused on fighting the near 
enemy (the apostate regimes or the western poppies) in their respective countries. There 
were almost no practical agreements between the jihadists to unify their efforts in order to 
achieve their goals. Thus, argument that considers all jihadists as one unit seeking to 
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establish the Islamic Khalifaht is a misleading perception. Even though the leaders of 
these groups voice this idea loudly, in reality, their different methods to achieve this goal 
have been self-destructive. Gerges argues, “Localism not globalism, informed the 
thinking and action of [jihadis] who had initially fought in Afghanistan.”51 
With respects to Bin Laden’s goals, the establishment meeting documents 
illustrate that Bin Laden had no specific future missions or fronts for jihadists. However, 
through his discourses and actions during that era, Bin Laden’s goals encompassed three 
main concepts. First, he wanted to secure the withdrawal of the United States troops from 
the Gulf area. Therefore, he offered his services to fight the Iraqi regime and to free 
Kuwait with jihadists instead of outsiders. When they refused his offer, he sharply 
criticized the Saudi House for inviting the American forces into the holy lands. In 1994, 
Bin Laden wrote a letter to the Saudi chief mufti, Bin Bazz, (the highest Islamic 
theological figure in Saudi Arabia). In this letter, he disparaged the Saudi house and Bin 
Bazz as well. He criticized the Saudi regime for supporting the peace agreement between 
the Palestine and the Israel in Oslo, and he accused the Saudi regime of corruption, as 
they invited the infidels (American forces) to the holy lands.52 Riedel argues, “This letter 
appears to be written more in sorrow than in anger. The tone is that of a man severely 
disappointed in his own government.”53 As he became more annoying to the regime, they 
responded by warning him and then limiting his free movements by confiscating his 
passport.  
Bin Laden’s second goal was to overthrow the southern communist party in 
Yemen, by supporting Islamist groups in that country. Abu Musab al-Suri argues that Bin 
Laden had no operational goals in Afghanistan, and Sheikh Osama did not have any 
specific projects other than supporting jihadist groups, except in Yemen.54 However, the 
end of the communism in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and in Yemen in 1994, after 
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most of the communist party was exiled from the country,  forced Bin Laden seek a new 
refuge. Consequently, he made his way to Pakistan, and from Pakistan, he moved to 
Afghanistan.  There, the Afghani groups were fighting each other over the capital. When 
he failed to reconcile the warring factions, he left Afghanistan and went to Sudan, where 
most Arab jihadists had moved previously.   
From Sudan, Bin Laden pursued his third goal, which was to achieve 
compatibility among the jihadists groups and to financially support other jihadists and 
provide personnel on some occasions. In his efforts to create this compatibility between 
the different jihadists, he formed the Islamic Army Shura that embraced members from 
all Middle Eastern and the North African states.55 In terms of financial support, Bergen 
cited Abdullah Anas recalling that Bin Laden spent 1.5 million U.S. dollars as a project to 
enter Kabul, which was under the communist party at the time. Bergen also argues Bin 
Laden gave al-Zawahiri $100,000 to support his organization. 56  In terms of physical 
support, in 1993, Bin Laden sent a group of fighters to Somalia. Although the number of 
al-Qaeda fighters is debatable, Bin Laden sent fighters to fight the American presence in 
the country because he claimed that the American intervention in Somalia was a product 
of American interests to undermine the Islamic movement in Sudan and achieve full 
control over the gulf region. 57 
E. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JIHADISTS 
The relationships in the jihadists’ community lacked compatibility. During this 
era, disputes surfaced between not only organizations in different countries, but also 
within the organizations themselves and other local groups.  The disagreements between 
the jihadists were usually about  the legitimacy means, selection of targets, Doctrinal 
ideals (Salafist, jihadists, and Muslim brotherhood ideology), organizational sovereignty, 
leadership positions, and the diversity of each groups’ goals.   
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1. Relations Between the GIA and the LIFG and With Bin Laden 
The relationship between the two major organizations, the GIA and the LIFG, 
through the mid 1990s reflected the depth of methodological and ideological differences 
within the jihadist community. After the eruption of the security situation in Algeria, the 
LIFG leadership decided to send a group of fighters to explore the situation and support 
their fellow Afghani fighters in Algeria. When the group arrived in Algeria, they secretly 
reported back to their headquarters in Sudan. Most of these reports indicated that the GIA 
were violating the doctrines of Jihad through the legitimization of the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians, authority disputes, and leadership competitions among the jihadist 
groups. They also reported propaganda that Algerian secret services had infiltrated the 
GIA. After sending two delegations, the LIFG decided to send a third group of 15 
fighters to be directly involved in operations alongside the GIA group. 58  
Noman Benotman, one of the well-known leaders among the LIFG, described 
how poor the relations were between the two North African groups as evidenced by what 
happened to the 15 fighters. He said, those fighters were not from the leadership line, but 
were chosen from among the best fighters from the Afghani war.59  Soon after the 
fighters had arrived in Algeria, the LIFG headquarters in Sudan lost their trace. The LIFG 
sent another team to find out what had happened to the previous group. This team 
reported back that the 15 fighters might have been be killed by the GIA. The GIA later 
admitted that this was the case. The GIA justified their killing by claiming that the group 
had left them and joined one of the rival groups in Algeria. Boudali argues this 
experience taught other groups to the danger of cooperating with the Algerians. “The 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) learned this lesson the hard way when the GIA  
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killed several LIFG fighters who had been sent to Algeria for joint training.”60In response 
to that event, the LIFG announced its disengagement and distanced itself from the radical 
acts carried out by the GIA.  
After [Djamel Zitouni] became the leader of the group, there was a 
noticeable change in the characteristics of the jihad waged under the 
banner of the Armed Islamic Group. Breaches and violations of Shariah 
law increased incrementally day after day… Blood was spilled, and even 
now, there is still no clear or compelling Shariah basis for its spilling… 
This was the case with [the killing of] Shaykh Mohammed al-Said, 
Abdelrazak Radjam, and others. Many Algerian Muslims were killed and 
their death was either denounced or was said to be as an act of deterrence 
or something like that. Eventually, the struggle appeared to be a battle 
between the movement and the Muslims of Algeria.61 
With respect to GIA relations with Bin Laden, Muhammad Mukadam argues Bin 
Laden offered the GIA financial support and fighters in exchange for the establishment of 
al-Qaeda training camps in Algeria. This was a request that Djamel Zitouni viewed as 
inappropriate bargaining.62 Therefore, Zitouni started to kill all al-Qaeda members and 
also started to target those who belonged to the Afghani current. He justified their killing 
by claiming they were Bin Laden’s spies.  In addition, Mukadam argues Bin Laden sent a 
satellite phone to Zitouni as a gift, but Zitouni ordered his group to kill the messenger 
who brought the phone.63 
2. Relations Inside the GIA 
The GIA did not only engage in confrontations and disputes with other foreign 
organization like the LIFG, but also experienced confrontations and disputes within the 
organization.  The GIA emerged as an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front Front 
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Islamique du Salut, FIS, which was a peaceful Islamic organization that won the 
democratic election in 1991. The GIA soon turned on the FIS and started to target its 
leadership, accusing them of apostasy for promoting democratic elections and 
consolidation with the tyrant regime.  The group reached its peak of extremism when 
Jamal Zitouni took over the group.   Haddam who was the president of the Parliamentary 
Delegation Abroad of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front claimed, “[This group the GIA] 
assassinated the main FIS leaders”.64 He adds, “This was this action of Jamal Zeitouni 
and his group, which eventually revealed its real identity: they are from At-Takfir wa'l-
Hijra.” 65  
RAND reported, “[The] GIA in its attacks drew no distinction between 
noncombatant supporters or opponents in its jihad against the regime. Anyone in Algeria 
who did not conform to the GIA doctrine was a potential target”.66 The policies adopted 
by the GIA leadership in general, and by Zeitouni in particular, caused tension and 
disagreements both inside and outside the organization. The GIA actions caused some 
individuals, like Essaid and Rajjam, to disengage themselves from the organization. In 
response, Zeitouni killed them both, and he justified their killing by claiming they were 
deviating from the right path by calling for reconciliation with the Algerian 
government.67 In July 1996, fellow jihadists ambushed and assassinated Zitouni.68  
After Zitouni’s assassination, Antar Zouabri, who was member of Zitouni’s GIA 
Shura Council, took command of the GIA.69 Zouabri gained power using very coercive 
means. When he took over the group, he started to kill anyone who did not agree with 
him. Moreover, he issued a fatwa that considered the Algerian people infidels and 
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apostates altogether. Consequently, the GIA started to lose its supporter base. It started to 
fall apart from the division and the departure of its members. Later, in 1998, the group 
changed its name into the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC). 
3. Relations Between al-Jihad and al-Islamiyah  
This dark image of the GIA relations in the mid-1990s was not distinctive to the 
jihadists’ project in Algeria; it was also a very common image of the relations of the 
jihadists’ project in Egypt. However, one can say that the Egyptian case was less bloody 
than the Algerian example. The disputes and the competitions between the Egyptian 
groups took the form of ideological and social conflicts, and did not involve weaponry in 
any significant way.  The two groups failed at two attempts to unify and merge into one 
organization. Gerges argues it was, “[because of the] unwillingness and inability of their 
senior leaders to put differences aside and transcend vested interests.” 70 
The organizations’ components played a big role in this division. The Islamic 
jihad embraced the elites like doctors, lawyers, teachers, military, and police officers, 
while al-Islamiyah recruited most of its members from the peasant class and uneducated 
youth. Al-Islamiyah was more popular and more active. Al-jihad left no significant mark 
in its confrontations with Egyptian regime, but al-Islamiyah did. Although the two groups 
sought the same idealistic benefits and recognized the urgent need for unification, their 
attempts to accomplish this   failed.   
The first unifying attempts failed because of an ideological disagreement over the 
legality of the blind being in command.  Al-jihad disagreed with al-Islamiyah over sheik 
Abdel Rahman as the leader of al-Islamiyah, because he was blind.  This doctrine, in 
Islam, is called wilayat al-dariir or rule of the blind. This issue was further complicated 
after the imprisonment of a blind sheik accused of planning attacks in the United States. 
Al-jihad disagreed with al-Islamiyah again over another doctrine called Wilayat al-Asier 
or the rule of the prisoner.   
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After the Egyptian government started to counter both groups during the mid 
1990s, they agreed about the urgency to unify their efforts to face the state. In 1994, the 
two groups made a second attempt to merge and unify as one organization, where a group 
of consults (Majles al Showra) would control both groups. This attempt also failed. The 
main issue that hindered their second attempt at unity was also of an ideological nature. 
They disagreed over an issue called the Excuse of the un-Knowledge or al-owther bel-
Jjahel, which means an individual, who commits a wrong doing unintentionally, is not 
responsible, and his lack of knowledge is excusable.  However, al-jihad argued that 
people should be held accountable for their actions and there are no excuses for a lack of 
knowledge. In response, al-Islamiyah accused al-jihad group of deviating from the Islam-
right path. 
4. Relations Inside al-Jihad and al-Islamiyah  
Neither of the two main jihadists groups in Egypt was free of internal strife. Al-
jihad fighters, who came back from Afghanistan, intended to be reserve forces on call for 
any critical situations determined by the leadership. Altaweel argues that those fighters 
had no idea about these plans. Therefore, upon their arrival they started to speak up about 
their experiences in Afghanistan. In addition, they also complained about their role in the 
confrontation with the apostate regime; “al-Islamiyah members are carrying out brave 
operations and we are hiding and doing nothing.”71  Each time al-Islamiyah launched an 
operation; they captured several people of al-jihad, simply because they were uninformed 
and unprepared. The government apparatus captured thousands of the group’s members 
and started to trail them in massive numbers in an operation called Tla’e al-fateh. In this 
environment, Ahmad Ājyzh and a group of others accused al- Zawahiri of freezing al-
jihad and maintaining a passive stand toward those who fall one into the hands of the 
Egyptian forces.   Therefore they dissented from al-Zawahiri and established their own 
organization called Tla’ e al-fateh.72 
                                                 
71 Altaweel, al-Qaida wa-Akhwateha, 13. 
72 Ibid., 137. 
 33
Inside al-Islamiyah, there was a disagreement over the truce initiative offered by 
the historical leadership from their prison cells in July 1997. This disagreement was a 
factor in the attack against tourism in the site of Luxor. The historical leadership 
condemned the attack while Refai Taha, a key leader in al-Islamiyah who opposed the 
ceasefire initiative, praised it. Refai Taha challenged the opinion of the imprisoned 
leadership by being one of the first signatories on the declaration announcement of the 
emergence of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders.73 
5. Bin Laden’s Relations 
As the establishing minutes reveal, al-Qaeda’s formation was a result of Bin 
Laden’s dissatisfaction with Azzam’s thoughts and the way he administrated Maktab al-
Khadamat. 74 Azzam was Bin Laden’s primary mentor during the mid 1980s, and despite 
Azzam’s contributions to his fame; Bin Laden started to distance himself from Azzam 
and disputes started between them. Bin Laden and Azzam’s relations were inversely 
proportional to Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s relations. As he became closer to al-
Zawahiri, he moved further away from Azzam.     
The dispute between Azzam and Bin Laden stemmed from two main themes: how 
to do jihad in Afghanistan and where to go after Afghanistan. Unlike Azzam, Bin Laden 
sought to establish separate Arab jihadists that operated independently of the Afghan 
factions. Contradictory to this view, Azzam sought to spread jihadists over the Afghani 
factions, as it would allow for better access to religious education, training, and different 
financial resources than they could find in separate camps. Another area of disagreement 
was over which faction the jihadist should support. Bin Laden wanted to support 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of al-Hezb-e Islami , while Azzam wanted to support 
rival warlord, Ahmad Shah Massoud (Lion of Panjshir), who was a thorn to the Soviets.  
In respect to where to go after Afghanistan, Assam’s disagreement was not with 
Bin Laden directly, but with his close circle of Egyptian members of al-Jihad. Azzam, as 
a representative of the Muslim brotherhood, believed that jihad efforts had to focus on 
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freeing occupied Muslim lands like Afghanistan, Palestine, and even Spain. To the 
contrary, Bin Laden’s close circle from al-Jihad sought to pursue the goal of 
overthrowing the apostate regimes in the Muslim world. Azzam rejected this concept. 
Hotifa Azzam recalls how al-Jihad members insulted and accused his father of being 
penetrated by American intelligence agencies, and how they abandoned his speeches in 
Friday’s sermons.75    
As with any other group, Bin Laden’s young-organization was not free of internal 
rivalry and disagreements. Gerges argues, “Al-Qaeda, like other bureaucracies, was 
susceptible to internal rivalries along, ethic, nationalist and regional lines and financial 
and petty quarrels stemming from favoritism and penny-pinching.” 76 Socially, there were 
disagreements between the jihadists over the influence of the Egyptians over the 
organization. Egyptians held all of the sensitive leadership positions.  
When al-Fadl testified in court after he left Bin Laden and defected to the USA, 
he was asked if the members of al-Qaeda complained about the number of Egyptians in 
al-Qaeda. He said yes, and he added that he had told Bin Laden about this issue. He also 
commented on the conflicts inside the organization over economic issues and said people 
in the organization complained about these issues. 77 Jamal Khlifa, Bin Laden’s brother-
in-law, argued that Egyptians replaced Bin Laden’s former close friends, as well as him. 
He added that Bin Laden did not listen to anybody except the Egyptians, who were able 
to manipulate and brainwash him.78   
Despite the empirical evidence that emphasizes Bin Laden’s close ties with the 
Egyptian al-Jihad group, Benotman contradicts such arguments recalling that “in 89 and 
90 a lot of people from the jihadi movements—they considered Bin Laden as a non-
Muslim—he doesn’t care about the Arab regimes. He doesn’t declare Saudi King Fahd a 
non-Muslim. He didn’t care to fight in India or Egypt or Algeria. And I heard from the 
leaders of the Egyptian Jihad: ‘spoiled Saudi with a lot of cash; that’s it; a decent soft 
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guy, nothing more. He’s not a Jihadist; he doesn’t know anything about how to launch 
war. He’s still thinking about the Saudis as if they are legitimate regime.”79   
After 1967, people in the Arab world lost faith in nationalist movements; 
therefore, they turned to the Islamic movements as a substitute. The invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Red Army in 1979, offered the oppressed Islamic movement an 
alternative place to go. Therefore, thousands of Muslim youths performed Hijrah 
(expatriation) from a place of oppression to a place where they could defend their 
brothers and build their capabilities.  It was an imitation of the prophet Mohammad’s 
(peace be upon him) journey from his home country (Makkah) where he was oppressed 
by his own people, to Madinah to build an Islamic Umah. A movement that had enabled 
Muslims to build their capabilities and then to achieve victory over those who oppressed 
them. Dialectically, the Afghan War era constitutes the establishment period for the most 
violent Islamic groups, who later returned to their home countries and entered into bloody 
confrontations with their regimes. 
Al-Qaeda and other current groups, as well as most of the Islamic movements 
back then, are portrayed as one unit (Umah) that seeks one ultimate goal (establishing the 
Khalifaht) with one distinctive mean, which is violence. This was and is a misconception 
of the realities about these groups and organizations. Before the declaration of the war on 
terrorism, which began on October 7, 2001 with the bombardment of Afghanistan, the 
jihadist groups displayed diversity in their goals.   In addition, their capability to sustain 
the Jihad work was limited, especially when they started fighting jihad inside their 
countries. Most importantly, their relations with each other were very poor. Rivalry 
marked their relations not only with each other level, but also within their own 
organizations. The next chapter will discuss how these groups failed to confront their 
local regimes as a result of the aforementioned issues.  Had U.S. policy makers 
comprehended these realities, they would have excluded a military response, and al-
Qaeda would have been isolated and neutralized.  
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III. THE DEMISE OF NATIONAL JIHADISTS AND AL-QAEDA’S 
RISE 
The previous chapter discussed the rise of localized Islamist insurgencies in the 
Middle East and North Africa. This chapter will discuss the failure of these insurgencies. 
It will also examine how they affected the growth of al-Qaeda after 9/11. The portrayal of 
al-Qaeda as a giant threat to the United States that represented all of the terrorist groups 
in the Middle East is common. This chapter will challenge this wisdom and argue that all 
jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, were doomed to fail under the pressure of the Middle 
Eastern regimes. The capability of these groups to mobilize the Islamic populace was 
limited to radicals with whom they enjoyed connections through kinships or work 
interactions. However, as chapter four will discuss, al-Qaeda and the groups that have 
merged with it have flourished after the declaration of the war on terrorism.  
A. JIHADIST FAILURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
By 1997, the jihadist’s efforts to overthrow the apostate regimes and establish 
Islamic states that uphold God’s law had failed. The result was an obvious landslide 
victory for the state and a humiliating defeat for these groups. The enormous losses 
suffered by these groups also embodied this failure.  Tens of thousands of detainees filled 
the government’s prisons. The regimes carried out real massacres against these groups. 
The harsh crackdowns and the massive intelligence operations, helped by the state media, 
brought the jihadists to their knees. They scattered over four main places: graves, prisons, 
asylum refuges, and on the run.  The following pages tell the story of how each group 
failed. 
1. Failure of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
The LIFG, established in Afghanistan in 1990, started to build its organizational 
capacity by forming cells inside Libya, recruiting people to its cause, and securing the 
needed tools (weapons, explosives, ammunition and finance) for their next battle with the 
regime. Crises events soon interrupted this phase, when the military establishment 
cancelled the democratic elections that the Islamic Salvation Front hoped would result in 
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its advantage.  In response to the Algerian crisis, the LIFG leadership sent its best fighters 
to Algeria on a scout mission to achieve several goals. First, they wanted to support the 
Algerian jihadists, especially those whom they knew and fought with on the Afghani 
fronts. Second, the LIFG wanted to secure a foothold in Algeria, especially at the borders 
with Libya, to use it as a platform for their future operations against al-Kaddafi. Third, 
the first readings of the situation in Algeria suggested that the GIA had the capabilities to 
topple the Algerian regime, and the LIFG believed that the GIA would pay back their 
efforts if they arrived into power. Finally, According to Benotman, “One of the reasons 
for going to fight in Algeria was to prevent the erosion of their members’ fighting skills 
after the war in Afghanistan.”80 However, as the saying goes, “The winds come 
undesirable to the ships,” and the results have been counterproductive and disastrous. The 
group that they sent soon clashed with the GIA leadership and never came back. Later, 
they discovered that the GIA leader, Jamal Zaitouni, liquidated the group.  
At their internal front, in July 1995 the LIFG had to prematurely leave the 
underground preparation phase and declare its existence publicly. Benotman argues that 
the deceleration was against the will of the leadership and was a consequence of an 
“amateurish and rogue operation”.81  In July 1995, a local cell of the LIFG carried out a 
rescue operation to free one of its elements, Khalid Bkachic, from al-Jala’a hospital in 
Benghazi where he was being held by the Libyan security forces for treatment. The 
success of the operation, and the manner in which they carried it out, sparked the anger of 
senior security officials, who insisted on uncovering the doers and arresting them. Search 
operations led the security forces to a farm on the outskirts of Benghazi, which the LIGF 
used as a hideout. After finding the farm, al-Kaddafi security forces dismantled cells one 
after another, and the organization fell down like “rosary beads”. Four months later, after  
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propaganda started to spread in the country about the real entity behind these operations, 
some opposition groups accused the regime itself of creating these events, so the LIFG 
decided to declare itself to the Libyan public.82  
Within two years of the LIFG self-declaration, the might of al- Gaddafi forces 
dissolved most of the group’s cells. Even the leadership of the group in Sudan could not 
escape al-Gaddafi’s influence. He exerted pressure over the Sudanese to uncover the 
Libyan fugitives and expose their leadership.83 To avoid any political consequences with 
Libya, Sudan asked not only the Libyans to leave, but also expelled all other jihadists 
groups. Under these circumstances, the LIFG’s goal was no longer to overthrow the 
regime, but simply to survive. Therefore, the group leadership issued an order to their 
followers not to initiate any operations against the Libyan forces unless it was necessary 
for self-defense. They ordered key figures to leave the country instantly and warned those 
who refused to leave that they faced expulsion from the group. In October 1997, the 
group suffered the loss of its leader, Abdul Rahman Hattab. 84  
“In 1999, Gaddafi declared his regime’s success in eliminating the armed Libyan 
Islamists in his country and in inflicting a fatal blow on the LIFG.”85 Altaweel argues that 
the escaped leadership moved to Turkey, where they called for a meeting to discuss their 
failure and the end of any armed activities in Libya. Although the group stopped acting 
against the regime after Hattab’s killing, it was not until the year 2000 that the LIFG 
leadership officially agreed to stop all armed actions against the Libyan regime for three 
years.86  In this way, the largest and the most consistent Islamic jihadists group of that era 
failed to achieve its goal.  
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The remaining individuals and leadership components of LIFG groups, like other 
Islamic jihadists, faced very limited choices. They had no place in their home countries, 
and they were no longer welcome in Sudan. In addition, most of the jihadists groups were 
on the watch lists of the international community.  Only Afghanistan, the motherland of 
the jihadists, opened its doors again to them after the rise of Taliban. 
2. Failure of the GIA 
What happened to the LIFG was not an isolated occurrence. The Algerian jihad 
project also ended in failure.  However, the latter, failed for reasons that are more 
sophisticated. First, the GIA encompassed groups that differed in their ideological 
perspectives, which were difficult to consolidate. The absence of an authoritative 
religious leadership to hold these different currents together and sort out disputes also 
contributed to its ultimate failure. Jihadists in Algeria solved their disputes with the 
liquidation of their rivals and rose to leadership positions through oppression, betrayal, 
and murder. Al-mukadam argues that the followers of the first leader of the GIA, 
Abdelhak Layada, ultimately betrayed him. They used the Afghani current to expose his 
location to the Moroccan authorities to get rid of him.87 Zitouni, who was selling 
chickens before he joined the GIA, rose to power in 1994. He represented the Takffiri 
current, and he started to liquidate those who opposed his strategy or represented other 
currents, including Mohamed Said and Abderrezak Redjam. Zitouni killed both, because 
he believed they deviated from the right path by belonging to another current called 
Algerianization (al-Jazzarh). Some believe that he also killed the leader Abu Abdullah 
hammed (Cherif Gousmi) in 1994, after accusing him and his deputy of working with the 
Shiites. Then Zitouni, the most notorious leader of the GIA, met his end at the hands of 
GIA's dissenters. Kohlmann argues, “[Many Mujahidin] have claimed that they left the 
GIA due to fear for their own lives and the harsh punishment applied on them.”88 
The second factor that contributed to GIA failure was the group’s actions against 
civilians.  The Algerian authorities succeeded in changing the course of confrontation 
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from a government-jihadist war to a civilian-jihadist war. Under the self-protection 
doctrine, the government gave weapons and ammunition to civilians, so they could 
protect themselves and their villages.  The GIA responded by issuing fatwa that deemed 
the Algerians infidels and legitimized their killing.  Antar Zouabri issued the fatwa, and 
called it the Great Demarcation (al-mufassala al-kubra). Zouabri’s religious advisor 
declared, “The murder of women and children consorting with ‘enemies of Islam’ was 
lawful and that the innocent among them would be admitted to Paradise. His readers were 
informed that those who had their throats cut in towns and villages were ‘supporters of 
the tyrant’ (taghout).”89 Consequently, “There have been nearly 200 massacres, 
perpetrated with appalling savagery. The victims have all been civilians. Neither women, 
children nor the elderly have been spared.”90 The confrontations with civilians resulted in 
nearly 100,000 deaths. Furthermore, the Algerian official report indicates that the total 
number of women raped by the GIA reached 2048 in two years. In addition, there were 
319 women kidnapped with no indication about their status until now (2007).91 These 
actions created a discontented sentiment against the jihadists that consequently drained 
their recruitment source. 
The third factor that contributed to the GIA’s failure was the shift of its strategy. 
It abandoned the idea of fighting the near enemy, and embraced a strategy that widened 
its operations theater to include cross border attacks (the far enemy). In December 1994, 
the GIA hijacked an Air France jetliner from Boumedienne International Airport in 
Algiers. Their plan was to plow the plane into Eiffel tower in Paris. French police rescued 
the hostages and killed the four perpetrators. The failed operation sounded an alarm not 
only in France, but also in Britain, which the GIA considered its rear base of financial 
and media support. The GIA escalated its confrontations with the French government in 
late 1995, when its associates launched four attacks that targeted four subway stations in 
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Paris, killing nine French citizens and injuring 160.92   Several months after the subway 
attacks, the GIA kidnapped seven French monks. For their liberation, the GIA demanded 
the French and the Algerian governments release Abdel Haq, the GIA’s former leader. 
When the French government refused the GIA demands, they executed the monks.  
The new front, opened by Zitouni with the French, had a negative impact on the 
organization. It altered the French position regarding its stand against the Algerian 
government. The French government strongly criticized the Algerian government’s 
measures that cancelled the democratic election and strongly supported the Algerian 
opposition's initiatives. However, soon after these operations, France turned to the 
Algerian authorities and lent support to undermine the jihadists’ project. The French also 
exerted pressure on the British government to uncover GIA related cells in the country. 
Consequently, the GIA lost an important source of support. The French and the British 
security apparatus launched crackdowns and arrest campaigns that dissolved the GIA 
associated cells and forced other Islamists to seek refuge elsewhere. 
The fourth factor that contributed to the failure of the GIA was the idea that 
Algerian secret services had penetrated the organization. This subject is debatable in 
formal circles both inside Algeria and at the international level; however, the jihadists 
who constituted the body of the GIA, especially those who disagreed with Zitouni and his 
successor Zouabri, left the organization because of this belief.  The unjustifiable killing 
of individuals who belonged to other currents, as well as the unreasonable killing of the 
Libyan fighters who came to support the organization, put the group and its leadership in 
the crosshairs of this charge. Most notably, the civilian massacres, as attributed to a GIA 
operations were concentrated on villages that were the most supportive of al-mujahedeen. 
Abu Hamza al-Masri, who supported the GIA from Britain through the al-Ansar 
publication,  argues, “No one at the time believed that this could be the work of any 
Islamic group, even the anti-Muslims themselves, they have all agreed that this is the 
work of the Algerian government, trying to put people off from Islam and Islamic 
ideas.”93 
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Al-Suri, in his testimony on the Algerian Jihad, presented five ideas that suggest 
the involvement of the Algerian secret services in the civilian massacres. They include 
his personal experience in guerrilla warfare, the testimony of the escaped Libyan fighters, 
the testimony of the GIA separated groups, the testimony of fighters that al-Suri later met 
in Afghanistan, and al-Suri’s personal investigation, which depended on media reports 
that included testimonies of Algerian army veterans who fled to Europe and exposed the 
issue.94  The evidence that al-Suri provided strongly supported the notion that the 
Algerian secret services penetrated the GIA to create a gap between the jihadists and their 
constituencies. In addition, the authorities wanted to present itself to the citizens as the 
only power capable of providing them security. Accordingly, citizens clung to the state 
more than to any other party. Furthermore, this policy helped to silence the Islamist’s 
vocal support outside Algeria. Thus, the GIA’s European cells, especially those in 
Britain, halted their media and financial aid after they became suspicious of the GIA’s 
illogical actions. As these actions did not help the Jihadists’ cause; instead, they alienated 
the group’s own followers and other sympathizers.    
This idea of Algerian infiltration into the GIA has also found support in two 
French journalists, Romain Icart and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. Both journalists interviewed 
Captain Hocine Ouguenoune and other former Algerian secret service members (DCSA) 
for a documentary film broadcast in 2002. According to the former captain, the Algerian 
secret service (DRS) recruited Djamel Zitouni, a chicken seller with 6th or 5th grade 
education, as an informant after they caught him in a morally compromising, homosexual 
situation.95 The documentary interviewed several other former military personnel who 
confess DRS penetrated the GIA. The journalists argue, “As [Zitouni] subsequently rose 
to the head of the GIA in Algeria, the DRS used him to carry out the executions of  
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Islamists who had joined the GIA and to spread terror through the civilian population. 
Surrounded by DRS agents, Zitouni and his GIA served the regime goal of securing 
French support through terrorist attacks.”96  
Under these circumstances, the GIA, which had unified 95% of the jihadists under 
its banner, started to fall apart and many of its components left the organization. The GIA 
was longer a cohesive militia force. Instead, it dispersed into four main parts.  The first 
part included the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and other separatists from the GIA, like 
the groups of ail Benhadjar and Mustafa Kertali. Madany Mezraq, the leader of the AIS, 
led this new group and soon opened a negotiation process with the Algerian authorities 
for reconciliation.97 In September 1997, Mezraq announced a truce with the government, 
and he called all jihadists to halt their armed operations in Algeria. His initiative spurred 
thousands of armed militias to lay down their weapons and benefit from the government 
civil concord initiative. Mezraq’s truce communiqué stated that the cease-fire call was an 
attempt;  
To make the enemies of yesterday and today face their responsibilities, to 
warn the faint-hearted of the harmful consequences of their cowardly 
behavior. To encourage sincere sons of Algeria who love their country to 
take the initiative to work together for the return of peace and stability, to 
bring the country out of its crisis, to foil the plans of those who are waiting 
for an opportunity to harm Algeria and the Algerians… and to unmask the 
enemy lurking behind the abominable massacres and isolate the residual 
criminals of the GIA and those hiding behind them.98 
The second part included mainly jihadists who represented the Afghani current 
and other jihadist individuals who distanced themselves from the FIS and AIS.  Hassan 
Hattab, a former GIA’s district leader, led this group. They sought to establish a new 
organization with a new outlook from the ruins of the GIA. “Mindful of how appallingly 
the GIA had tarnished its name throughout the Muslim world, Bin Laden allegedly urged 
Hattab to work with others to establish a rival mujahedeen organization in Algeria and 
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present a ‘better image of the Jihad’ against the secular government.”99  Accordingly, 
under the supervision of Bin Laden, who reportedly contacted him over a satellite phone, 
Hattab established a new organization in 1999 called the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC). The new organization denounced the massacres tied to the old 
leaders of the GIA, separated itself from them, and called for other jihadists to unify their 
efforts to fight the regime. “With its new agenda, the group managed to amass hundreds 
of defectors from both FIS and the GIA; in less than two years, the GSPC grew nearly 
five times in size—from an estimated 700 to 3,000 active fighters.”100 
The remaining GIA members who stayed with Zouabri comprised the third part of 
the jihadist community in Algeria. Authorities and separatists who clashed with Zouabri’s 
ideologies and behaviors, continued to attack this group. Consequently, their capabilities 
declined, and according to the 2008 country report on terrorism, its members number less 
than 40.101  “The GIA was never officially dissolved, though by 2001, it had become 
largely defunct, [and] Zouabri was finally killed in a clash with Algerian security forces 
in the town of Boufarik in February 2002.”102  
The fourth part of the Algerian jihadists included those who left Algeria and went 
back to Afghanistan. Abu Musab al-Suri claims members of this group tried to collect 
themselves and rearrange their papers to restart working in their goals. They formed a 
group that was struggling in difficult circumstances to revive a jihad in Algeria. The 
events of September 11th and the consequences that followed overcame them, so they 
abandoned their project and took up positions in the battle against the United States 
invasion. Many of them record their names in the list of martyrs or prisoners, as victims 
of “September 11th’s groove”.103 In this way, the Algerian-jihadists’ project failed, as the 
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military establishment managed to get a grip on the country and defeat the jihadists’ 
attempts to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state in Algeria.  
3. Failure of the Egyptian Jihadists  
The strategy that al-Islamiyah adopted brought unexpected consequences and 
proved destructive to its organization as well as to al-Jihad group. The Islamic revolution 
approach in Iran had a strong influence on Al-Islamiyah, Their open confrontation with 
the regime and populist revolutionary approach triggered government crackdowns and 
harsh response. Al-Suri argues that when the government uncovered one al-jihad cell and 
found one of its associated army officers, they had launched two arrest waves. Al-Jihad 
lost more than 1500 of its members in these raids, when the government found most of 
their names in a confiscated computer that belonged to the group’s membership 
director.104  As al-jihad was a secret organization comprised of elite and high ranking 
officers, it was impossible for them to recover from this loss of manpower.  
Unsuccessful attacks and the adoption of suicidal techniques were additional 
factors that contributed to the failure of al-jihad. . In August 1993, the group carried out 
their first suicide attack against Egyptian interior minister Hasan al-Alfi, but he escaped 
with only minor injuries.  The technique itself triggered a debate over the legality of such 
actions in Islam; as this practice was exclusive to the Shiites and the Sunni populace had 
rejected it. Three months after this attack, al-Zawahiri encountered another major failure. 
The group attempted to liquidate Prime Minister Atef Sidqi. The operation failed, and, 
instead of killing Sidqi, the attack killed a young schoolgirl, Shayma. The girl’s death 
sparked anger in the Egyptian streets against the jihadists and spurred the government to 
employ countermeasures that were more aggressive.  
Al-Zawahiri’s situation worsened as Sudan expelled him after the Mubarak 
assassination attempt in Addis Ababa and his execution of two Sudanese boys. The two 
events put the Sudanese under international, regional, and domestic pressure to uncover 
the perpetrators and expel all jihadists from the country.  In addition, the Sudanese 
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perceived his execution of the two boys, who were Egyptian spies, as a disregard for state 
sovereignty. Consequently, they ordered him to leave Sudan.   
At this stage, al-Zawahiri lost the battle with the Egyptian regime on all fronts. 
Authorities had arrested or killed most of his organization’s members; he failed to gain 
Egyptian sympathy and support; and he lost his save haven in Sudan. Accordingly, he 
called on his followers to cease operations against the Egyptian regime in 1995.105 In his 
confession, al-Najjar revealed that, the group (Al-jihad) suffered a great loss of 
manpower as security forces captured or killed most of their members by the mid-1990s. 
Moreover, the group could not overcome their funding difficulties during this period, 
because most of their financial resources went to the families of prisoners and casualties. 
Al-Zawahiri suspended operations in Egypt, so he could regroup.106  After 1995, the 
Jihad group did not launch any operations against the regime in Egypt. This indicates that 
the group failed to achieve its goals at the local level, just like all of the other 
contemporary Islamic radical groups in the Arab world.  
Since the Egyptian’s harsh crackdowns were not limited to the al-jihad group, Al-
Jemaah al-Islamiyah also suffered a great loss of manpower to imprisonment and death. 
After al-Zawahiri suspended al-Jihad operations, al-Islamiyah realized the impossibility 
of overcoming the state might. By the 1997, there were almost 20,000 jihadists in 
Egyptian prisons, 90 percent of them were members on al-Islamiyah.107  As a result, al-
Islamiyah took the first step toward reconciliation with the regime in July 1997, in what it 
called “the nonviolence initiative.” 
The group’s leadership took the initiative from their prison cells and a defendant 
declared their objectives during one of his hearings. In this initiative, the group 
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announced an end to all acts of violence in Egypt and abroad.108 Four months into the 
initiative, a group of six al-Islamiyah members attacked tourist groups in Luxor and 
killed 62 people. This incident was a manifestation of the division between those who 
wanted consolidation and those who promoted violence. With the exception of some 
minor attacks, al-Islamiyah succeeded in banning violence after 1997. Their initiative 
was milestone in the group’s political approach. It marked the beginning of a new 
peaceful political phase and was an indication of the end of the Islamic Jihadist project 
that espoused violence to achieve political ends.  
4. Al-Qaeda Failure 
Looking at what al-Qaeda represents today, it seems paradoxical to say that they 
have failed. However, the empirical evidence shows that during the mid 1990s Bin Laden 
had not achieved his goals. His financial assets had evaporated, his organization had 
fallen apart, and, most importantly, he lost his save haven in Sudan. Consequently, he 
applied for asylum in Britain.  
Bin Laden did not achieve any of his goals in the mid-1990s. First, American 
forces, which he wanted to expel from the Gulf area, have increased their numbers and 
remain in almost every country in the region. Second, his effort to overthrow the Yemeni 
regime and establish an Islamic state also failed. President Saleh reached out to the 
jihadists through dialogue and tribal influence.  He also offered jobs and cash. Al-Suri 
argues that most of those jihadists entered the military at high ranks and some of them 
became close to Saleh in his guard forces and in his intelligence establishment.109 Third, 
the Islamic Military Counsel that Bin Laden established in Sudan failed bring different 
rival groups together. Most importantly, all of the groups that he supported failed 
dramatically in their respective countries.  
From a financial standpoint, Bin Laden took a significant hit when the Saudi 
house froze his assets and confiscated his passport. Additionally, he used the resources 
                                                 
108 Khalil al-Anani, “Jihadi Revisionism: Will It Save the World?,” Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies, 2, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB35.pdf, (accessed October 18, 2010), 2. 
109 Al-Suri, Da’wat al-Moqawmah, 799. 
 49
that remained to support the Sudanese government. In exchange for a safe existence, he 
purchased military equipment for their army establishment and helped build up their 
infrastructure. He also supported other jihadists, paying their salaries and covering their 
operational expenditures.  L’Houssaine Kherchtou, a member of al-Qaeda who testified 
as a witness in the 2001 trail of the suspected African-U.S. embassies attackers, argued 
that Bin Laden faced a financial crisis in the years 1994-5. He recalls, “Osama Bin Laden 
himself he was talking to us and saying that he lost all his money….he reduced the salary 
of people….When I wanted to go renew my flight licenses…he told me ‘just forget 
it’.”110 Kherchtou also added that the organization could not offer him U.S. $ 500 to take 
his wife to a hospital to give birth.111  The salary shortage prompted some of al-Qaeda 
members to leave the organization. Al-Fadl, who joined al-Qaeda very early during its 
establishment phase, serves an example of this point. He stole U.S. $ 110,000 from Bin 
Laden and surrendered himself to an American embassy. He then became a significant 
source of information about al-Qaeda. 
At the organization level, the structure of al-Qaeda during this period started to 
assume a semi-hierarchical shape. It was more like a firm, with Bin Laden as its chairman 
or administrator than a military organization with a leader at its top. Although the 
organization had committees like the media committee, the military committee, and the 
business committee, commands did not always come directly from Bin Laden. The 
Egyptian’s jihad within al-Qaeda would disregard Bin Laden and give orders without his 
permission. Abu Walid al-Masri, the editor of the Arabic Taliban’s magazine al-Imarah 
(the Emirate), argues  that Bin Laden’s main two figures and former al-Jihad members, 
Abu Hafs al Masri and Abu Abidah al Banshjeri, sought to acquire Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) without Bin Laden’s approval.112 Due to his lack of experience in 
military science and leadership, Bin Laden used to send those who sought his guidance to 
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Abu Hafs (Mohammad Atef).  Bin Laden’s leadership of al-Qaeda looked more like the 
administration of a corporation than the organization of a militia. Abu Jandal, Bin 
Laden’s former bodyguard, argues that Bin Laden’s activities and interests were oriented 
primarily toward investments and construction work in Sudan.113  
Additionally, Bin Laden failed to attract those who had fought with him in 
Afghanistan and could not maintain the membership of some associates. Abu Jandal 
recalls that Bin Laden sent messages to “al-Qaeda veterans” from Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia and asked them to join him. According to Abu Jandal, the best reply he received 
was from those who said “O Abu Abdullah we cannot join you, now we have families 
and children that needed to be taken care of.”114  
In 1995, Sudan felt pressure at all levels and this affected the al-Qaeda 
organization. To find relief for the organization, Bin Laden started to ask some of al-
Qaeda members to leave. In his testimony in the U.S. court, L’Houssaine Kherchtou 
recalls that, upon the Sudanese request, Bin Laden told his Libyan members to leave al-
Qaeda and leave Sudan. Bin Laden told them “You have to leave, because if you don't 
leave, you will be responsible for yourselves, and if somebody caught you, I am not 
responsible.”115 According to Kherchtou, Bin Laden offered them U.S. $2400 and tickets.  
The Libyans were very angry with Bin Laden because he could not protect them, so they 
left al-Qaeda. 
By the end of 1995, Bin Laden realized that all jihadist projects were collapsing in 
the Arab Muslim world. He also knew that he had become an unwelcome person in this 
world. In addition to his financial crisis, he barely escaped an assassination attempt 
carried out by the Takffiri current in Sudan.  During this period, under pressure from the 
international community in general and the Arab regimes in particular, Sudan informed 
Bin Laden and the other jihadists to leave the country. Consequently, Bin Laden 
contacted his vocal supporter, Khaled al-Fawwaz, in London to find out whether or not 
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he could move to Britain. “Michael Howard, who was then Home Secretary, recalls how 
his aides told him of the asylum request from the Saudi-born militant… we picked up 
information that Bin Laden was very interested in coming to Britain. It was apparently a 
serious request.”116 Britain denied Bin Laden’s unofficial request, and the immigration 
authorities issued a banning order to prevent Bin Laden from entering the country. 
At this point, Bin Laden’s choices were limited; he could choose surrender or 
confrontation.  Abdel Bari Atwan claims that when he was invited to interview Bin 
Laden in his cave in Afghanistan in 1996, Muhammad Atef told him, that “Bin Laden felt 
he now faced two clear option [after being expelled from Sudan]: he could return to 
Saudi Arabia to spend the rest of his life either in detention or under house arrest, or he 
could begin a full-on military campaign against his enemies, which he would continue 
until he was captured or killed.” 117 
B. AL-QAEDA RISE  
At the request of the Sudanese, Bin Laden flew back to Afghanistan, specifically 
to Jalalabad, where local warlords welcomed him. 118 During this period, the Taliban was 
in the last phase of its mission to control the capital Kabul. Some Arab jihadists assisted 
them, as they saw the Taliban as the most legitimate movement to rule the country. In this 
context, al-Najjar claimed that Adel Abdul-Bari, the head of the Islamic Jihad’s media 
committee, issued a report that assessed the movement (Taliban). The report praised the 
Taliban in all its aspects and described it as a religious Salafist movement led by a group 
of students. 119  
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The Taliban opened its doors to the defeated jihadist from the Muslim world. In 
return, Bin Laden supported the Taliban with cash and some of Al Qaeda’s most 
committed fighters to help them continue fighting the northern alliances’ troops. The 
Taliban tried to avoid the ideological clashes between the different jihadist groups, as 
they realized that such a clash might undermined their authority. Therefore, the 
movement (Taliban) connected with Bin Laden help realize their vision. In addition, they 
asked Bin Laden to avoid the media, as the movement was still in its building phase and 
the northern alliance still posed a threat..120 This request came after Bin Laden wrote 
several public letters and conducted many international interviews. In one of his letters, 
Bin Laden “recounts the ‘oppression, hostility, and injustice [committed] by the Judeo-
Christian’ against the Ummah. Bin Laden concludes with a call to arms: ‘your enemies 
are the Israelis and American, Cavalry of Islam, be mounted!”121 Riedel argues that he 
wrote this letter in anger and it was the manifesto declaring war on America.122 Although, 
Bin Laden promised Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, he would comply with his 
requests, he broke his promise after he became secure in Afghanistan. In the beginning of 
1998, Bin Laden collected 40 signatures from Taliban scholars and the Pakistani that 
supported his earlier communiqués. He once again espoused the legitimacy of expelling 
American forces from the holy lands in the Arabian Peninsula.123   
In February 1998, Bin Laden announced the formation of the new organization: 
the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders (al-Jbhh al-Slamyh al-
Almyh Lqtal al-Yhwd Walşlybyyn).124 From then until September 11th, 2001, Bin Laden 
spoke of enmity against the United States and released several communiqués that 
indicated he was planning something against American interests. He put these plans into 
action on August 7 1998, by bombing of American embassies in Dar-es-salaam and  
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Nairobi. The bombings marked a dramatic course change in the jihadist’s goals. Bin 
Laden and al-Zawahiri, with some Pakistani and Bangladeshi militants under the World 
Islamic Front, initiated the war “against the far enemy”. 
The attack prompted the U.S. administration to retaliate with Cruise missile 
strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan. Both strikes were unsuccessful. The media 
exploited the situation and protest-marches against the U.S. response occurred almost in 
every Muslim country.  Bin Laden’s prior experience with the jihadists during the war 
against the Soviets and his current experience with the American response helped him 
formulate his next strategy.  He intended to drag the United States into an aggressive war 
of retaliation that would force all jihadists join the fight, either willingly or unwillingly.  
Bin Laden’s goals became very clear; he wanted to fight the far enemy instead of the near 
enemy. He realized that fighting any regime on a national basis was doomed to fail; he 
learned this lesson from earlier jihadist’ failures. Moreover, Bin Laden recognized the 
causes of the earlier failures; the United States supported the regimes, so it would be 
more effective to fight the “puppeteers instead of the puppets” or the snake’s head instead 
of its many tails.  Al-Bahri recalled incidents when al-Qaeda members asked Bin Laden’s 
permission to carry out operations against their regimes, Bin Laden responded ‘‘leave 
them alone and do not preoccupy yourselves with them. They are scum….when they 
witness the defeat of the United States, they will be in their worst situations.”125 
The period from 1998 to September 11 was most critical for al-Qaeda and other 
jihadists. This period reshaped the jihadists’ map (Table 3), redefined alliances between 
some groups and led to disassociation between others. From 1998 to 2001, Bin Laden 
successfully attacked three American targets: the American embassies in Dar-Es-Salaam 
and Nairobi, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole in Yemen, and on September 11th, Bin 
Laden shocked the globe when his followers hijacked civilian planes, attacked the World 
Trade Center, and killed more than three thousand people.  
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1. The Jihadists’ Response to Bin Laden’s Escalations 
It is very important to shed light on how other Islamic groups in the Islamic world 
reacted to Bin Laden’s speeches and actions. With the exception of the al-jihad group, no 
group agreed with or encouraged Bin Laden’s escalations.  Even the Taliban, at some 
point, asked Bin Laden to halt his media speeches.126 On September 13, 1998, an 
American official met with Taliban official Adul Hakim Mujahid. During this meeting, 
Mujahid informed the U.S. official that 80 percent of Taliban opposed Bin Laden’s 
presence in Afghanistan, and he advised the U.S. administration to be patient with Bin 
Laden’s issues.127  He also told the U.S. official that the Taliban warned Bin Laden to 
avoid political and press activities and confiscated his communications assets.128 Kenneth 
Katzman argues, “Since the August 1998 U.S. retaliatory strikes on the Afghan camps 
and the Sudan pharmaceutical plant, the Taliban leadership has tried to dissociate itself 
from Bin Laden by asserting that he is no longer its guest.”129 
After Bin Laden’s announcement about the establishment of the World Islamic 
Front, he sent delegations to convince other jihadist groups to join him, but none agreed. 
Benotman, a key leader in the LIDFG, recalled that when Bin Laden’s delegation 
proposed an alliance with the new organization (World Islamic Front), we refused and 
said, “That Bin Laden’s project does not comply with our goals and such projects will 
never succeed.”130 Like other jihadists, “The LIFG’s members preferred to ally 
themselves with Mullah Omar and the Taliban who were giving them protection rather 
than with Bin Laden and Zawahiri, whom they accused of trying to create a state within a 
state in Afghanistan.”131 
                                                 
126 Altaweel, al-Qaida wa-Akhwateha, 285. 
127 Bergin, the Osama Bin Laden, 232. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, Congressional 
Research Service, , September 10, 2001), 11, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/crs20010910.pdf, (accessed November 10, 2010). 
130 Altaweel, al-Qaida wa-Akhwateha, 291. 
131 Pargeter, “LIFG.”  
 55
Al-Zarqawi is another good example of someone who disagreed with Bin Laden’s 
project.  Al-Zarqawi, who formed al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group in Afghanistan after his 
release from prison in Jordan, refused to join Bin Laden’s project. Bootie argues, 
“Though [Al-Zarqawi] met with Bin Laden in Afghanistan several times, [he] never  
joined al Qaeda. Militants have explained that Tawhid was ‘especially for Jordanians 
who did not want to join al Qaeda.’ A confessed Tawhid member even told his 
interrogators that Zarqawi was ‘against al Qaeda’.”132 
Abu Jandal, who joined al-Qaeda in late 1996 and later became Bin Laden’s 
personal guard, argues that when Sheikh Osamas declared the war against the Americans 
there was nobody with him except the remaining of the Egyptian fighters and some 
Algerians. There was nobody with him from Yemen or the Arabian Peninsula. They used 
to call us “the founders,” because we were the first group to join him and we were 17 
fighters.133 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, most of the jihadists returned to 
their home countries with an agenda to overthrow the apostates and establish Islamic 
states that recognized Sharia law. However, the jihadists had failed to achieve this goal 
through violent means. The regimes retained control and brought the jihadist groups to 
their knees. Even Bin Laden’s organization almost languished during the mid 1990s 
under the pressure of the Muslim regimes in Sudan.  
Bin Laden realized the impossibility of winning the battle against the regimes in 
the Muslim countries. He realized that he could overcome the lack of compatibility 
between different groups; the disagreements among the jihadists within the same 
organization or within the same country’s groups over authority and minor doctrine; and 
the inability to mobilize the Muslim populace, by redirecting the confrontation to the far  
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enemy instead of the near one. With exception of part of an al-Jihad group, represented 
by al-Zawahiri, and Refai Taha from al-Islamiyah, Bin Laden failed to attract any of 
other jihadist groups to this strategy. 
Furthermore, other jihadists and some members of al-Qaeda itself disapproved of 
his project to confront the United States. However, “Bin Laden never listened to the 
warnings voiced by both the “hawks” and the “doves” within the organization that the 
United States would be a ‘ruthless rival’ that should not be underestimated in a military 
struggle.”134Benotman argues that al-Suri, an important theological figure in al-Qaeda, 
hated Bin Laden’s leadership, and he used to call him “dictator and he even called him 
Pharaoh”.135 Arguably, Bin Laden was aware of American retaliation. He planned to drag 
the United States into a war that would unleash Islamic anger, mobilize the Islamic 
public, and unify jihadist groups. The next chapter will examine this hypothesis by 
looking into the new al-Qaeda organization.  
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Table 3.   Jihadist Map up Until 9/11 Attacks 
Organization Name Leadership Goals Component 
The World Islamic 
front for Jihad 
against the Jews 
and Crusaders and 
later Qaedat alJihad 
Bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri 
Fighting the American  
existents in the holy lands  
1. Al-Qaeda organization  







Advocating  political 
reforms with peaceful means 
after 1997 reconciliation     
Peasants, uneducated 
members, and typical citizens 





Dawah wal Qital) 
 
Hassan Hattab “Fighting in jihad against 
the Algerian regime and its 
masters among the Jews and 
Christians [in order] to 
restore the Caliphate.”136 
The group avoided civilian 
killing.  
1. Defectors from the 
Islamic salvation front 
(FIS). 
2. Defectors from the 
(GIA). 











movement and Reorganizing 
itself to fight the apostate 
regime in Libya.   
The remaining of the LIFG 
group who managed to escape 








Overthrow the kingdom of 
Jordan and fight the Israeli 
occupation to free Palestine  
1. Jordanian afghan veterans 
2. Syrians 







Establishing an Islamic state 
in Morocco, and later 
supporting al-Qaeda  
1. Moroccan Diaspora 
communities 
2. Moroccan Afghan 
veterans 





Tarek Maaroufi Seeks to establish an Islamic 
regime in Tunisia  
1. Tunisian diasporas in 
Europe and elsewhere 
2. Tunisian afghan veterans  
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IV. AL-QAEDA SINCE 9/11: 2001–2010 
Chapter III discussed the demise of the  jihadists on a national level.  This 
chapter examines how the war on terrorism came to serve Bin Laden.  First, it unified 
terrorist groups against the far enemy, and diverted their focus from the apostate regimes 
at the national level.  Second, the war, perceived as a crusade, unified and mobilized the 
Islamic populace in support of Bin Laden’s cause.   Third and most importantly, it caused 
a change in the organizational structure of Al Qaeda, which shifted from a hierarchical, 
isolated organization to horizontally decentralized and diffused groups.  The organization 
now includes affiliates and aspirants who seek to attain the status of al-Qaeda’s brand of 
terrorism. 
A. THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
Nine days after the 9/11 attack, President Bush addressed Congress.  In his 
September 20 speech, the president declared the war on terrorism.  He said, “Our war on 
terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 137 This declaration came 
from a place of anger as President Bush stated, “Our grief has turned to anger and anger 
to resolution.”138 Apparently, the war was a retaliatory reaction sought to alleviate citizen 
frustration more than it was a planned strategy to eliminate terrorism. The administration 
dealt with 9/11 perpetrators in the same way that they dealt with Pearl Harbor’s attackers 
in 1941. Accordingly, a military response to 9/11 was the administration’s first choice.  
During that speech, President Bush demanded that the Taliban: 
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in 
your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you 
have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid 
workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every 
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and 
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every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the 
United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure 
they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation 
or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand 
over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.139 
Although the Taliban was hosting Bin Laden, 80 percent of the Taliban 
government opposed his existence before 9/11. Benotman, a leader of the LIFG who 
attended the meetings held in Afghanistan between Bin Laden and other jihadist groups’ 
representatives during the year 2000, claimed that the Taliban warned the United States 
through its Mulla Jalil about a future attack by al-Qaeda against them.140  This indicates 
that the movement was fully cooperating with the U.S administration.  
Even after 9/11, the Taliban was not principally against handling Bin Laden, but 
they were against the manner in which the U.S. ordered them to do so. The movement’s 
leadership realized that handling Bin Laden without sufficient evidence to justify their 
actions would instigate conflict between them and Islamists. Therefore, they asked the 
United States to disclose any evidence that suggested the involvement of Bin Laden in 
the 9/11 attacks, and upon that they would hand Bin Laden over to a third party for a fair 
trial. Former CIA station chief Milt Bearden argues that he had no doubt about the 
intention of the Taliban to get rid of Bin Laden, but he claims, “We [the United States] 
never heard what they were trying to say….We had no common language. Ours was, 
‘Give up Bin Laden.’ They were saying, ‘Do something to help us give him up.’”141   
Consequently, U.S troops deployed to southern and central Asian bases. The 
mission was not limited to neutralizing al-Qaeda. It was also to destroy the Taliban 
movement and all jihadists in Afghanistan.  On October 7, 2001, the United States started 
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its air campaign against Afghanistan. Within days, the northern alliance, backed by the 
international forces, ousted Taliban and brought the capital under control. Although, 
Operation Enduring Freedom succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban regime, killing 
hundreds of al-Qaeda operatives, and capturing hundreds more, it did not end terrorism. 
On the contrary, al-Qaeda still exists today, and it poses a more significant threat than it 
did before 9/11.  
The total war approach and the collective punishment strategy adopted by the 
administration came to serve Bin Laden more than it hurt him. First, the invasion changed 
the nature of al-Qaeda narrations and fostered its theological justifications to pursue 
Jihad. Before the invasion, al-Qaeda justified its attacks with an Islamic doctrine called 
offensive jihad (Jihad al-Talab). This doctrine legalizes an offensive war against an 
[infidel] country when it poses a direct threat to a Muslim country.  However, this 
doctrine has a very limited capability to mobilize the Islamic populace for a variety of 
reasons. First, it constitutes one of the most debatable issues in Islam; hence, there is a 
division over its interpretation. Few interpreted it in the same way that Bin Laden did. 
Second, according to this doctrine, Jihad becomes Fard Kifaya; this means if a group of 
Muslims undertakes Jihad, the obligation falls on others. 
The invasion gave Bin Laden the opportunity to create a new narration based on 
one of the most settled doctrines in Islam: defensive Jihad (Jihad al-Dafe’a). This 
doctrine specifies that Muslims must defend any Islamic territories attacked by [infidels]. 
In this case, pursuing Jihad becomes Fard Ayn; which means every single Muslim should 
pursue Jihad by himself, even without the permission of their family or rulers. Two 
months after the invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Laden had conveyed a message to Muslim 
youth that incited them to participate in Jihad against the United States of America. In 
that letter, he said, “the Jihad has become an obligation upon each and every Muslim. We 
advise the Muslim youth not to fall victim to the words of some Ulema who are 
misleading the Umma by stating that Jihad is still a communal duty [Fard kifaya].”142 
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Second, the U.S. approach forced those who opposed Bin Laden to participate in 
the war, either willingly, in the defense of a Muslim country or unwillingly, in self-
defense. Third, the war on the Taliban fulfilled the prophecy of Abu Hafs al-Masri, al-
Qaeda’s third in command. He professed that the United States would use the mujahidin 
in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade the country and secure its oil interests.  In 1996, 
Abu Hafs reported about the Taliban movement, its components, capabilities, 
weaknesses, and its future challenges. According to Abu Hafs, the United States wanted 
to take control of Afghanistan to secure the oil and gas movement from the Caspian Sea 
to the warm water in the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan. This would keep Iran from 
transporting the oil through its territories, and Americans would contract a U.S. $ 5 
billion project.143 Al-Qaeda used this narration to delegitimize the counterterrorism 
regimes and attract more recruits from the Muslim world. 
Finally, the war approach distorted the efforts to eliminate al-Qaeda. Therefore, 
instead of only tens of al-Qaeda operators, the war put several hundreds other jihadists, 
whose goals were very different from al-Qaeda, thousands of the Taliban and their Pashtu 
supporters, and a great number of sympathizers into the enemy trenches. Abu Jandal 
argues, “America has primarily served Sheikh Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
Organization. When Sheikh Osama attacked America, he wanted to expose it to the 
Islamic world. He also sought to expose its evil. This is what really happened.”144 
Two years later, the United States troops invaded Iraq as a continuation of the 
global war on terrorism. They accused Saddam Hussein of having relations with Bin 
Laden, and warned that he might transfer his weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda. 
The war fulfilled Bin Laden’s 1998 prophecy “that the United States had long intended to 
destroy Iraq, the most powerful Arab state.”145More importantly, the war disrupted 
coalition efforts to destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and provided Bin Laden with an 
excellent opportunity for relief.  Graham Allison argues, “In the war on terrorism the U.S. 
government has had great difficulty staying strategically focused. After a strong start the 
                                                 
143 Bergin, the Osama Bin Laden, 237. 
144 Al Hamadi, "Inside Al-Qaeda,” March 26, 2005, 17. 
145 Daniel, the Five Front War, 10. 
 63
diversion…[to the] war in Iraq sucked much of the drive out of the war on terrorism and 
blurred the targets.”146 This diversion gave Bin Laden and the Taliban movement the time 
and space they needed to reorganize, consolidate with other groups in Afghanistan, and 
start launching attacks against the international forces.  Additionally, the Iraq invasion 
sparked the Islamic populace, especially after the administration failed to provide 
evidence of Iraq’s WMD’s or its relation to al-Qaeda.  Thousands of zealous young 
Muslims rushed to take a stand and defend a Muslim country.  
B. AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AFTER THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM  
From one perspective, the war on terrorism, manifested in the extensive use of 
military force in two lengthy wars, has achieved some success. The 2007 Congress 
Report Service enumerates many achievements. These include the death or capture of 
more than 2/3 of al Qaeda’s top leadership, the confiscation of over $200 million in 
terrorist resources, the capture of key terrorists in the two war zones, the death or capture 
of hundreds of insurgents, and the disruption of al Qaeda terrorist plots to infiltrate the 
United States.147  
On the other hand, U.S. military operations have also helped Bin Laden. First, 
operations unintentionally unified terrorist organizations. Most of the jihadist 
organizations shifted their goals from fighting the near enemy (their apostate regimes) to 
fighting the far enemy (the United States and its western allies). Bin Laden had pursued 
this goal for long time during the mid-1990s, but never achieved it. This unification came 
from the American retaliatory response that arbitrarily placed all jihadist organizations 
into a single enemy category.  
Second, the war served al-Qaeda by expanding its horizontal structure. It became 
a global movement, commanded by one exclusive ideology, instead of an isolated 
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organization commanded by one person. Bin Laden himself became more of a symbolic 
figure than a physical leader of the group. Therefore, his death will not end terrorism. On 
the contrary, his death will make him hero to Islamists, and his death will be a catalyst for 
jihad.  The organization is now loosely structured and decentralized, which makes it more 
difficult to detect and to defeat. This maximizes their movement capability and their 
ability to pose a direct threat to the U.S interests. It also maximizes their resilience and 
their capacity to minimize the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. “In an August 
2009 speech, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 
stated, ‘Al Qaeda has proven to be adaptive and highly resilient and remains the most 
serious terrorist threat we face as a nation’.”148 Al-Qaeda is currently a diffuse global 
network, composed of three main segments, each with varying degrees of independence. 
These are the mergers, the affiliations, and the aspirants (Figure 4). 
1. Al-Qaeda Mergers 
In the wake of 9/11, President Bush left no place for neutrality; he declared, 
“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”149  Unfortunately, his rhetoric left 
jihadists with no choice. They joined Bin Laden’s organization. Most of the groups that 
fought with Bin Laden in Afghanistan during 1980s and then travelled with him to Sudan 
during the mid1990s reconnected with al-Qaeda after the United States invaded of 
Afghanistan.  
Within several years, Bin Laden attracted these groups. Consequently, they 
pledged allegiance and obedience to Bin Laden This meant that they carried out his 
orders, sought guidance from him, and supplied the organization with information, 
money, and personnel. More importantly, these groups placed Bin Laden’s goals and 
objectives above their own.  Mergers with al-Qaeda signal the highest possible 
commitment to the terrorist network and are best represented by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
or (Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  
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a. Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers 
(AQI)  
Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn is the name taken by 
Zarqawi’s jihadist group, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, after it merged with al-Qaeda in 
October 2004. Although al-Zarqawi met with Bin Laden in Afghanistan several times, he 
was not interested in joining with al-Qaeda. Bin Laden sent al-Zarqawi several messages 
inviting him to the Bay’at while they were in Afghanistan, but al-Zarqawi refused.  Bin 
Laden and al-Zarqawi differed in several ways. First, their goals were different. Bin 
Laden wanted to fight far enemy and al-Zarqawi wanted to fight the near enemy. Second, 
Bin Laden is a moderate compared to al-Zarqawi; especially when dealing with the 
Shiite.  “Bin Laden prides himself on being a unifying figure and has made tactical 
alliances with Shiite groups, meeting several times with Shiite militants.”150 “Zarqawi, by 
contrast, favors butchering Shiites, calling them ‘the most evil of mankind . . . the lurking 
snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating 
venom’.”151Third, after the invasion of Afghanistan, the jihadists, including al-Qaeda, 
and their hosts, the Taliban, suffered great losses of manpower, safe havens, resources, 
and organizational coherence. Al-Zarqawi left Afghanistan for northern Iraq to pursue his 
own agenda and fight the near enemy. Had they had good relations, al-Zarqawi would not 
have left Afghanistan.   
In February 2003, al-Zarqawi grabbed the world’s attention when 
Secretary of State Colin Powell accused him of collaborating with Bin Laden.  Powell 
also claimed that Saddam’s secret forces had infiltrated al-Zarqawi’s organization.152 In 
March 2003, the United States led the invasion to topple Saddam’s regime in a 
continuation of the war on terrorism. The invasion fulfilled Bin Laden’s 2002 prophecy,  
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which warned the Iraqis and the Muslims about a military campaign against Iraq. 153 
Therefore, thousands of mujahidin, inspired by Bin Laden’s words, entered Iraq to defend 
the Muslim country against the invasion.   
The Iraqi war distracted the United States from its efforts in Afghanistan. 
This gave al-Qaeda some breathing room and a chance to regroup. Instead of focusing on 
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the United States opened a new front in Iraq. Consequently, this 
action produced a new outlook for terrorists and offered a new save haven for al-Qaeda. 
The security vacuum created by the dissolution of the Iraqi police and armed forces gave 
Zarqawi and other terrorist groups the environment to build formidable terrorist 
organizations. According to the 2006 International Crisis Group report, by 2005, there 
were 13 active terrorist groups in Iraq, and those groups comprised more than 50 brigades 
and battalions with an average of 100 to 300 individual for each brigade.154  
The failure to identify the real ideology, goals, and relations between al-
Qaeda and al-Zarqawi led the U.S. to consider him a direct threat. However, the U.S. 
could have neutralized al-Zarqawi had they comprehended the fact that he had a poor 
relationship with Saddam’s regime and with al-Qaeda.  
Soon after the invasion, al-Zarqawi became a famous terrorist figure 
credited with 30 percent of the attacks in Iraq. His charisma, brutality, and fame attracted 
foreign fighters to his organization. While fighting the U.S led invasion, al-Zarqawi 
adopted two main strategies. First, he targeted the international symbols and 
nongovernmental organizations to isolate the United States from its international support. 
The Madrid bombing, London subway bombing, and bombing at the United Nations 
headquarters in Iraq were all elements of this strategy. Second, he aggravated a sectarian 
civil war between the Shiite and Sunnis to create a domestic turmoil by indiscriminately  
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attacking Shiite clerks, civilians, and shrines.  The killing Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir 
al-Hakim, as well as the bombing Shiite holy places in Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra are 
clear examples of this strategy.  
To gain more support and sympathy, al-Zarqawi reframed his ultimate 
goal. His maintained his principle goal, which was to fight the regime in Jordan and 
guarantee a supply of recruits from both Jordan and Palestine. However, he added a new 
dimension based on Iraqi nationalism and sectarianism to attract recruits from the Sunni-
Iraqi population and give his group an Iraqi face. Finally, he allied himself with al-Qaeda 
to draw recruits from those jihadists who infiltrated Iraq. In October 2004, al-Zarqawi 
announced his alliance with al-Qaeda and changed the name of his group from Jama'at al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) or 
Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers. Bin Laden blessed this 
alliance, and in return, he appointed al-Zarqawi the prince (Amir) of the al-Qaeda branch 
in Iraq and the neighboring counties, including Turkey.  
The new organization became a rally point for foreign jihadists, who 
became very dependent on al-Zarqawi’s network. Al-Zarqawi offered those who came to 
perform their compulsory duty of Jihad safe houses, weapons, explosives, and guidance 
in a country with which they were not familiar. Although an American air strike killed al-
Zarqawi in mid-2006, his death did not affect the organization in terms of its monthly rate 
of attacks. The rate of attacks kept increasing for the next two years. Additionally, the 
death of al-Zarqawi seemed to enhance the relationships among different jihadists, and 
accordingly, unified most of the Islamic factions under the banner of the Islamic State of 
Iraq with al-Qaeda at its core.  Although there is no clear study that compiles data about 
al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq, one cannot overlook the rate of violence in Iraq and the numbers 
of fatalities, casualties, and displacements. These rates suggest that the war approach is 
not the proper response to eliminate terrorism.  The heavy usage of air strikes against 
targets has killed thousands of civilians and triggered anti-American resentments and a 
desire for revenge. In other words, the war created an environment that is most suitable 
for terrorism recruitment.    
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b. Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
Hassan Hattab, leader of the most notorious Algerian terrorist group, the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), responded to the 9/11 attack with 
criticism and a denial of Bin Laden’s involvement. Kameel al-Taweel argues that 
neglecting Hattab’s criticism of the attacks and putting his organization on the terror list 
led to his ousting and replacement with more radical leader.155 Hattab’s successor, Nabil 
Sahrawi (a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim Mustafa), issued an important video in May 2004 in which 
he condemned the war on terrorism: 
Here, we have evil America declaring a crusade and preparing the troops 
of the infidels to attack Islam everywhere. President Bush and many high 
officials clearly and loudly declared that this is a religious war under the 
banner of the cross. The goal of this war, which they called a ‘war on 
terrorism’ and ‘war against evil’ and other names, is to keep Islam and the 
Muslims from establishing the Country of Islam that would rule people 
with the book of Allah and His prophet.156 
Evan F. Kohlmann argues that the sweeping war on terrorism sparked a 
wave of anger across the Muslim world, and the GSPC openly “adopted a role within a 
larger, transnational jihad against America”.157 In September 2005, Sahrawi’s successor, 
Abdelmalik Dourkdal released a communiqué promoting and legitimatizing violent 
actions against the United States of America: “The world war between Muslims and 
Christians has already begun… the leader of the infidels, Bush, has clearly declared this 
war three times to be a crusader war.”158    
After establishing contact with al-Qaeda and specifically with al-Zarqawi, 
Dourkdal agreed to merge under the banner of al-Qaeda and pay Bin Laden al Bay’at. On 
January 24, 2007, Dourkdal, with the blessing of Bin Laden, changed the name of his 
group from the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat to the organization of Al-
Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After the establishment of the new alliance, the 
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group carried out bloody attacks against selected targets that represented mainly 
American interests. Interestingly, before 9/11, the group did not target any Americans in 
Algeria. Although they killed and kidnapped hundreds of foreigners, not one was 
American. The first attack that manifested their alliance with al-Qaeda targeted a bus 
carrying employees of a U.S. Oil company. The attack killed one person and wounded 
nine others, most of them Western (British, American, and Canadian).159 Then a suicide 
bomber representing the group attacked the United Nations’ headquarters (UN) in 
Algeria and killed about 40 people depicting al-Qaeda attack against the UN’s 
headquarters in Iraq. Figure 1 shows how the rate of attacks against western targets 
increased after the group merged with al-Qaeda.  
 
Figure 1.   Number of Successful Attacks by the GSPC and AQIM from January 2006 
through March 2008160 
The failure to consider the rivalry between al-Qaeda and the leadership of the 
Algerian jihadists during the 1990s by launching a total war on terrorism enhanced the 
jihadists’ relationship and shifted the nature of their goals.  As a result, the group that 
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once struggled to connect with other regional groups became more attractive to jihadists 
in North Africa. The AQIM sought to establish connections with other North African 
terrorist groups in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania. In April 2006, Ambassador 
Henry A. Crumpton testified that “the once Algeria-centric GSPC…has become a 
regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all throughout the Mahgreb—and 
beyond to Europe.”161 
After the declaration of the war on terrorism, the group shifted its priorities from 
fighting the near enemy to fighting the far enemy, as the far enemy threatened all groups 
with the same fate as al-Qaeda. Dourkdal explained this dramatic shift in the group’s 
goals as a reaction to U.S. policy in the global war on terrorism. He said, “We found 
ourselves on the blacklist of the U.S. administration, tagged with terrorism. Then we 
found America building military bases in the south of our country, and conducting 
military exercises.”162 Accordingly, the organization goals became the same as al-Qaeda 
the mother as declared by the new organization leader Dourkdal.163 Figure 2 illustrates 
that the rate of rhetoric referring to the United States and the Jews increased after the 
alliance.   
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Figure 2.   AQIM’s Rhetoric from March 2005 through March 2008 
c. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
The Yemeni government, like many other Arab regimes, supported the 
mujahidin in Afghanistan. However, their motives were different.  They wanted to 
undermine the active communist party in the southern part of their own country.  They 
believed the southern government was receiving support from the Soviets and might be 
able to maintain independence and threaten the unification project.  Shaul Shay and 
Rachel Liberman argue that during the Afghan war, 30,000 Yemeni fighters participated 
in the war against the communists.164 Most of them returned home after the Soviet 
withdrawal to fight the communists in the southern part of Yemen.  
In the early 1990s, events escalated in the Gulf when the United States 
deployed a half million American soldiers to expel Saddam’s forces from Kuwait. At the 
same time, the Saudi House rejected Bin Laden’s proposal to use al-mujahedeen to fight 
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Saddam and invited U.S. troops to the holy lands. The Yemeni government, contrary to 
most Arab leaders, supported Iraq and opposed the war. Saudi Arabia, in return, kicked 
out thousands of its Yemeni emigrants, and other Gulf countries did the same.  
As a result, the Yemeni perceived the United States as an enemy. 
Consequently, Yemeni jihadists with close ties with Bin Laden plotted several attacks 
against American targets and hoped to force the Americans to leave the Arabian 
Peninsula. Their first anti-American attack, they bombed hotel in Aden where American 
soldiers stay on their way to Somalia. Then the Yemeni jihadists plotted to shoot down 
American military planes at Aden airport. However, with the unification of Yemen in 
1994, President Abdullah Saleh neutralized those fighters by offering them military ranks 
and other endowments.  
Some Jihadist groups, including the Islamic Army of Aden and Islamic 
Jihad of Yemen, continued to plot against American interests through the 1990s. In 1998, 
they kidnapped two Americans who were among 14 British and Australian tourists in 
Yemen. The operation that freed the hostages killed three British citizens and one 
Australian and wounded one American and three other tourists. In 2000, the jihadist 
groups, under the direct supervision of Bin Laden, succeeded in attacking the American 
destroyer, USS Cole, with an explosive laden fishing boat. The attack killed 17 American 
sailors and the two perpetrators. Another attack against American targets occurred when 
a militant entered a hospital and killed three American doctors.  
After the 9/11 attack, the Yemeni government feared American retaliation; 
hence, it showed its full readiness to cooperate with the U.S. administration in the global 
war on terrorism.  To show its commitment to the U.S. administration, the Yemeni 
government launched major crackdowns against jihadist groups hiding in the self-
governed tribal areas.  In 2002, after an extensive intelligence operation and an 
interchange between the Yemenis and their counterparts at the American embassy, an 
American drone strike killed Abu Ali al Harthi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen. 




among them al-Harithi’s successor, Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal who they captured on 
November 25, 2003. 165 This success led to the general dissolution of terrorists groups in 
Yemen.  
In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, accusing them of building a 
weapon of mass destruction and maintaining ties with al-Qaeda.  The U.S Administration 
failed to convince Muslim nations that their cause was valid. U.S. policy concerning Iraq 
was a double-edged sword relative to the Yemeni terrorists. First, they perceived the war 
as a direct conquest in the Muslim world. Hence, the invasion sparked wave of hatred 
against U.S policy in Iraq. Second, it distracted the U.S. administration, as well as the 
Yemeni government, from the mission to eliminate terrorism in the country.  The U.S. 
policy shift included the suspension of Yemen from the USAID program as part of its 
anti-corruption campaign.166 These measures constrained the government’s ability to 
fight terrorism and to provide necessary services for its citizens.  
Under these circumstances, the new form of al-Qaeda emerged. In 2006, 
al-Wahayshi, his prison-mate Qasim al-Raymi, and 23 other fugitives escaped from 
prison.  Al-Wahayshi, a former Bin Laden assistant, assumed leadership of the group, and 
soon he started to launch successful attacks against western targets. Two years after the 
escape, the group published its first publication under the name of Sada al-Malahem. In 
the editorial, the group announced that the publication emerged as a response to al-
Zawahiri’s call. In their third publication, the group warned western individuals to leave 
the peninsula. According to the editorial, the group promised to carry on al-Zarqawi’s 
policy and intended to behead the [infidels].167  In 2008, the group plotted several mortar 
attacks against the American embassy. The most significant attack was in September 
2008, when two suicide cars and four suicide individuals breached the embassy.   
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Although the attack failed, it killed seventeen people including one American woman.  
The group had issued an announcement indicating that the operation was a response to 
Bin Laden’s call.  
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emerged in the beginning of 
2009 as coalition between the al-Qaeda cells in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Many believe 
that the new organization comprises several hundred operatives supported and protected 
by the eastern province tribes. Although al-Wahayshi, the leader of the AQAP, 
emphasizes the importance of fighting the near enemy, he believes that it is also 
necessary to attack the interests of Israel, the United States and Europe in the Arabian 
Peninsula. “Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs in Washington, said, 
‘Yemen had become the third-largest haven for al-Qaeda, and the group there is perhaps 
the most stable when compared to units operating in Iraq, North Africa and South 
Asia’.”168 Recently the Christmas Day bombing attempt on Northwest Flight 253 from 
Amsterdam to Detroit highlighted the capability of the AQAP to target American 
interests. The group’s determination to target American interests after the Christmas plot 
is evident in their attempt to ship three remote bombs on cargo planes from Yemen to the 
United States of America.  Figure 3 illustrates the increasing rate of fatalities and 
casualties since the group has adopted al-Qaeda’s tactics and commands.  
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Figure 3.   Numbers of Casualties and Fatalities of Terrorism Attacks in Yemen169 
2. Al-Qaeda Affiliates  
Al-Qaeda affiliates are the second-highest form of connection to the terrorist 
network. Affiliates include those organizations and terrorist groups that maintain a good 
relationship with al-Qaeda but remain independent of it.  These groups are currently 
enjoying or have enjoyed Bin Laden’s support. “Some affiliates receive money, training, 
and weapons; others look to the core leadership in Pakistan for strategic guidance, 
theological justification, and a larger narrative of global struggle.”170 Although these 
organizations focus mainly on internal struggles; that is, they want to establish Islamic 
states in their respective nations, they look at Bin Laden as a legitimate defendant of al-
Ummah and a supporter of their causes.     
Bin Laden fostered his connections with these groups and organizations to 
achieve several goals. First, he wanted to persuade them to shift their focus from fighting 
their local regimes (near enemy) to fighting the far enemy.  Second, he wanted make sure  
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these organizations would offer his operators any logistical resources they needed to 
facilitate attacks. This support could include the provision of safe houses, fraudulent 
documents, target information, and equipment.  
Bin Laden maintained good relationships with most of the active terrorist groups 
around the world. Intelligence claims that Bin Laden retains relations with 23 terrorist 
groups.171 “According to U.S. officials, Al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 
70 countries.”172 Although studying the details of al-Qaeda’s affiliates is beyond the 
scope of this research, this thesis will briefly examine Bin Laden’s affiliation with the 
Somalia Islamist group, Al Ittihad Al Islami (AIAI).  
a. Al Ittihad Al Islami, IUC, and al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen in 
Somalia 
In 1991, the Somali government collapsed and the country fell into 
turmoil. Al-Ittihad Al Islami, established in the mid 1980s, seized this opportunity, along 
with the Islamic Courts, to present itself as a political power that sought to restore order 
in the country. After Barrie’s communist regime fell, Bin Laden, who stationed in Sudan, 
sought to support Al-Ittihad’s efforts to establish an Islamic estate in Somalia. The 
collapse of Barrie’s regime sparked a civil war among different warlords on one side and 
different Islamic groups on the other side. The war displaced thousands and killed 
thousands more. The anarchic political environment, coupled with poverty and drought, 
led to a half million deaths in the early 1990s. 
In 1993, the American military intervened in Somalia to protect the United 
Nations humanitarian mission.  However, Islamists and Bin Laden perceived the 
intervention as a direct threat to the Islamic project in Somalia and in Sudan. Therefore, 
between 1992 and 1993, Bin Laden sent his military advisor Mohammad Atef to train 
Islamist fighters on explosives and Guerrilla tactics so they could fight the U.S. military 
in Somalia. Allegedly, those trainees were the key fighters who killed eighteen U.S 
marines in 1993. “Some analysts believe Bin Laden devoted up to $3 million towards the 
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establishment of an Islamic state administered by al-Ittihad al-Islami.”173 According to a 
CNN report, when they interviewed Bin Laden in 1997, he admitted that his followers, 
along with the local jihadists, had killed the 18 marines.174  
Contrary to this argument, others believe that the Somali response to al-
Qaeda intervention was largely negative. According to Bin Laden’s former bodyguard, 
Abu Jandal, who went to Somalia for jihad, the Somalis gave him a hard time when they 
asked him if he belonged to al-Qaeda. Abu Jandal argues that al-Qaeda was not been 
welcomed by the Somalis. Therefore, they left the country after the U.S. withdrawal.175 
Tribal influence over the Islamists groups contributed to the limited existence of foreign 
fighters among the Somalis factions. It seems that Bin Laden’s connections were limited 
to an individual level, especially his connection to Muhammad Farrah Aidid, who fought 
against the United States intervention.  
The 9/11 attack brought Africa in general and Somalia in particular under 
U.S. scrutiny awareness again. Concerns arose about the possibility of Bin Laden’s 
exploitation of the Somali issue. The U.S administration feared that Somalia, a failed 
state with an Islamic government in control, would provide a safe haven to al-Qaeda, as 
the Taliban did. Therefore, in an effort to oust the ICU, the administration formed an 
opposition party composed of several secular warlords called the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC). In mid 2006, the ARPC clashed with 
the ICU in Mogadishu in a bloody confrontation; however, the ICU resolved the battle to 
its advantage.   
By June 2006, the Islamic Court Union succeeded in controlling the 
capital and most of the county regions after defeating the (ARPC). The (ICU) - (ARPC) 
war exposed the U.S. and Ethiopian intentions to overthrow the Islamists in Somalia. As 
a result, it raised anti-American and anti-Ethiopian sentiments. Additionally, the (ICU) 
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realized the urgent need for unity among different groups for preparedness and armament 
acquisition.  Accordingly, it embraced the al-Ittihad group and other Islamist factions and 
established its own military wing, which later became the Harakat al-Shabaab al-
Mujahedeen. Although the (ICU) applied a strict code of Sharia’h law in the country, it 
had significant achievements in both security and the services it provided. They reopened 
the country’s sea and airports that had been closed for 15 years. They launched harsh 
crackdowns against warlords and pirates. Additionally, the ICU earned the credit for 
ending the civil war. It was the first relative peace in Somalia since the collapse of Barrie 
regime. These measures increased the popularity of the ICU, and consequently, 
legitimized it domestically and regionally.   
In late 2006, the United States provided air support to the Ethiopian 
military forces that swept Somalia and ousted the IUC. In the aftermath of the invasion, 
the country fell again into a Quasi-Civil War between the Islamists and the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) supported by the Ethiopian forces. The United States’ 
support of the invasion contributed y to the increase of terrorism in Somalia and fostered 
the Somali terrorists’ relations with Global-jihadists. First, it undermined a strong 
political and legitimate party and replaced it with a weak entity that had no legitimacy. 
Second, the Somalis perceived the U.S intervention as a direct support of a Christian state 
against a Muslim one. This fostered Bin Laden’s narration that the War on Terrorism was 
a manifestation of the [crusades] third, “The ouster from power of the ICU by Ethiopian 
forces in December 2006 created a security vacuum that was soon occupied by the more 
radical elements of the ICU’s military factions.”176 Soon after the invasion, some 
hardliners split from the relatively moderate ICU and formed a new group called Harakat 
al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen or al-Shabaab. 
Before the invasion, there were plethora reports that indicated a limited 
existence of al-Qaeda in Somalia. Their numbers, if any, did not exceed a half dozen. 
However, after the 2006 invasion, the Somali Islamists called for foreigner-jihadist 
support. On December 23, Yusuf Mohammed appealed to Muslim jihadists for the first 
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time. He said, "We're saying our country is open to Muslims worldwide. Let them fight in 
Somalia and wage jihad, and God willing, attack Addis Ababa…. We want anyone who 
can help remove the enemy to come in.”177 Within days of Yusuf’s call, the Islamic 
website, al-Sahab, released an audio message from al-Zawahiri to all Muslims. He urged 
them to support the Somali jihadists in their fight against the Ethiopians. He said; “I am 
here calling upon the Muslim Ummah in Somalia to resist in this new battlefield of the 
Crusaders’ war, which is launched by America, its allies, and the United Nations against 
Islam and Muslims.”178 Additionally, he encouraged the jihadists to employ al-Qaeda 
tactics when he said, “You have to use ambushes and mines, and raids and suicidal 
attacks”. 179  
Foreign fighters started to infiltrate the country to fight alongside al-
Shabaab against the TFG and the Ethiopians. In 2009, the estimated number to foreign 
fighters in Somalia, according to Somali officials and African Union sources, was about 
400.180  The war approach in Somalia, as well as in Iraq, came to serve Bin Laden and 
helped him achieve what he could not during the 1990s. In 2009, the leadership of al-
Shabaab pledged alliance with Bin Laden in a videotaped message titled, Labaik ya 
Osama (At your service, Osama).  The convergence of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab gave the 
latter significant legitimacy; therefore, it enhanced al-Shabaab capabilities to attract more 
recruits, even from Somali Diasporas.  Scott Mulligan argues, “Law enforcement [in the 
United States] has speculated that the 20 [Somalis] left the United States in order to train 
and fight in Somalia’s on-going civil war or to train for terrorist operations.”181 The  
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ability of al-Shabaab to recruit individuals from the United States and Europe increased 
the possibility of al-Qaeda using those individuals to carry out terrorist operations in the 
United States.    
3. Al-Qaeda Aspirants 
Al-Qaeda aspirants are those with the weakest connection to the al-Qaeda 
network, but they represent a phenomenon that measures the appeal of the al-Qaeda 
brand. Al-Qaeda aspirants exist on two levels: groups or individuals. They pose a greater 
threat to counterterrorism than affiliates and mergers, because they are hard to detect, 
monitor, and disrupt. The number of groups and individuals aspiring to be part of al-
Qaeda’s global movement is a strong indication that Bin Laden is winning over the mind 
and hearts of the Muslim audience.  It also indicates that the United States is falling 
behind on this front. Sympathy for Bin Laden is evident in a 2004 opinion poll. In this 
poll, 65 percent of the Arab populace admired Osama Bin Laden and only 7 percent 
admired President Bush.182. The U.S policy to fight al-Qaeda and the invasion of two 
Muslim countries are two factors that contribute to the U.S. losing at the fronts of the 
“war of idea”.  
One of the most important forms of al-Qaeda aspirants are “homegrown” radicals 
in western countries. Within 10 years of 9/11, there were about 40 terrorist plots in the 
United States perpetrated by U.S. citizens. Half of them were converters to Islam, 
inspired by al-Qaeda, but not directly associated with it.183 Scenes of war on television 
and in internet forums showing the bloodshed of thousands of innocent people in the 
Muslim world have became al-Qaeda recruitment posters. The ideas of a defensive war 
and compulsory jihad are spurring individuals, cells, and groups step up to help their 
Muslims [brothers] in other countries. 
Such entities are capable of following Bin Laden’s broad orders, directions, and 
theological guidance through internet chat rooms and his periodically released 
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videotapes.  They do not the core organization’s finances or detailed plans. Marc 
Sageman argues that 78 percent of all terrorist plots between 2004 and 2009 in the West 
were a product of “autonomous homegrown” cells “without any connection, direction, or 
control from al-Qaeda’s core or its allies.”184 Among the 40 plots after 9/11, four resulted 
in attacks. The Fort Hood attack, carried out by Army Major Nedal Hassan, constitutes 
the most tragic one.  In November 5, 2009, Major Nedal opened fire with his two pistols 
against fellow U.S solders.  He killed 13 and injured about 40 others. 
Another form of al-Qaeda aspirant is those who look to al-Qaeda as a perfect 
example in terms of structure, theology, and goals. Therefore, they seek to mimic al-
Qaeda’s tactics and draw inspiration from its leadership. In 2006, such group had 
emerged in Lebanon under the name of Fateh al-Islam. The group’s goal, specified by its 
leader Shakir al-Abasi, was to fight the Jews, the Americans, and their loyalists.185 
According to al-Abasi, although his group was independent from al-Qaeda, he had no 
reservations about supporting its cause. A similar situation occurred in Jordan. In 2006, 
the Jordanian government dealt with 10 different cells. Each had no direct connection 
with al-Qaeda, but they were carrying its ideology. Therefore, the homegrown radicals 
add a new dimension to al-Qaeda’s organizational structure. Apparently, the perception 
of the war on contributes to the emergence of such groups.  According to Rick Nelson 
and Ben Bodurian, the perception of U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other Muslim countries as a war on Islam and its 
adherents is the common theme that spurs individuals to radicalization.186 
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V. CONCLUSION   
A. SUMMARY 
In the wake of the tragic 9/11 attack, the U.S. administration chose military might 
to respond to al-Qaeda.  Consequently, voices that suggested dealing with al-Qaeda from 
a criminology perspective fell on deaf ears. Likewise, voices that called for rooting out 
the cause behind terrorism, instead of dealing with its symptoms, also went unheard by a 
U.S. public seeking retaliatory attacks. The Bush administration promised to eliminate 
not only al-Qaeda, but also every terrorist group around the globe. This thesis examined 
the effect of this approach, utilizing U.S. military might to combat al-Qaeda and its 
peripheral organizations, on al-Qaeda organizational structure.  
After nine years of utilizing U.S. military might to combat al-Qaeda, it is 
important to examine its effectiveness on eliminating adversaries. Additionally, the 
implications of this war approach in terms of its economic, human, and social costs 
underscore this importance. In terms of financial costs, operations related to the war on 
terrorism cost $1.121 trillion from 9/11 through 2010. Analysts expect this number to 
reach $1.5 trillion in 2012. In terms of human cost, the war has killed almost one million 
people, injured about 1.8 million others, and displaced eight to 10 million. Despite these 
facts, the U.S. administration, policymakers, and media rely in on body count metrics to 
determine the success of the war approach. They measure this success in the death of 
two-thirds of al-Qaeda’s operatives, capture of several hundred terrorists, freeze of $200 
million of al-Qaeda’s financial assets, and the denial of a safe haven to al-Qaeda.  
However, reality suggests al-Qaeda is now stronger than it was before 9/11, and it still 
poses an imminent threat to the west in general and to the United States in particular, 
which is evident in the increasing rate of its attacks post-9/11 (Figure 5).   
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Figure 5.   Al Qaida Attacks, 1995–2007 (Excluding Iraq and Afghanistan)187 
The paradox between the logic and reality of al-Qaeda is a product of using the 
wrong metrics to examine the effectiveness of the war approach. Thus, this research uses 
the organizational structure metrics, instead the body count ones. The main argument of 
this thesis is that while the war approach affected the organizational structure of al-
Qaeda, it did so to the organization’s advantage. The war approach has changed al-Qaeda 
from an isolated, limited, and hierarchal organization into a global ideological movement.  
Qualitative analyses of al-Qaeda history and a cross-time comparison between al-
Qaeda pre-9/11 and al-Qaeda post-9/11 foster this argument. The research covers three 
main periods in al-Qaeda history: the organization’s establishment era, the period that 
extend from 1998 when Bin Laden declared the war against the west until the U.S. 
administration declared the war on terrorism, and post-9/11. Additionally, the research 
focuses on analyzing al-Qaeda’s organizational structure, goals and its relations with 
other contemporary groups over these three periods. Along with the history of al-Qaeda, 
the research also examines the history of the main jihadist groups that were operating 
                                                 
187 Seth G. Jones, How Terrorist Groups end: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida, (RAND Corporation, 
2008), 111. 
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during the late 1980s; the Egyptian jihadist groups (al-Islamiyah and al-jihad), the Libyan 
Islamic fighting group, and the Islamic armed group in Algeria. There were several 
reasons to look at these particular groups. First, the Egyptian groups, especially by who 
associated themselves with al-jihad groups like al-Zawahiri, contributed to the 
establishment of what is now al-Qaeda. Second, groups in Libya and Algeria ones came 
into being around the same time as al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda formed in the late 1980s; the 
LIFG formed in 1991–1992, and the GIA formed in 1991. Third, these groups all fought 
in Afghanistan against the Soviet Army, but they still preserved their distinct identities, 
different goals and different ideological currents. Fourth, after the U.S. responded 
militarily to the 9/11 attack, most of these groups merged under the banner of al-Qaeda, 
either at the individual or organization level. 
B. FINDINGS  
First, using military force to combat al-Qaeda has proven to be counterproductive. 
The total war approach came to serve Bin Laden more than it hurt him, as it fostered his 
organization’s structure horizontally. The present organization encompasses mergers, 
affiliates, aspirants, and radicalized individuals.  The organization has diffused into 
groups and cells that operate in more than 70 countries around the world.  Before, it was 
a single isolated and vertically structured organization. The war on terrorism changed the 
structure of al-Qaeda and made it more sophisticated and resilient. Al-Qaeda, like most 
other terrorist organizations, established itself with a classical organizational structure, as 
a top-down hierarchical organization with Bin Laden at its top as a controller. However, 
after 9/11, Bin Laden became more of a symbolic figure than a leader. As a direct 
response to the war approach, the structure of this organization flipped and became a 
bottom-up movement. Members are voluntarily defending the ideas behind al-Qaeda, but 
not al-Qaeda itself.  Therefore, the killing or capturing of al-Qaeda operatives is not 
necessarily a good indication of the effectiveness of the war on terrorism.  
Second, not all terrorists are al-Qaeda. Before the war on terrorism, al-Qaeda was 
an isolated group in Afghanistan. Like any other terrorist groups in the Islamic world, it 
was not free from internal and external rivalry. The portrayal of al-Qaeda and other 
 86
jihadists as one cohesive threat is a misguided conception. The jihadist organizations that 
were active in the Muslim world before 9/11 had two common characteristics. First, they 
limited their goals to fight the “corrupted regimes” or “the near enemy”. Second, the 
jihadist groups could not sustain their activities. They failed for several reasons 
including:  difficulty with recruitment an inability to legitimize their actions, and lack of 
coordination and rivalry within the jihadist community due to different ideological lines. 
However, the war approach unleashed Islamic anger and contributed to the ease of its 
mobilization, thus it increased opportunities for al-Qaeda recruitment. It helped al-Qaeda 
legitimize terrorist actions, because they shifted the focus of the terror from apostate 
Muslims to the infidels who occupied Muslim lands. Most importantly, the metaphoric 
“war” solidified the concept of defensive jihad, which includes the compulsory 
responsibility of each Muslim to be part of this defensive war. Consequently, it dragged 
all terrorist groups out of their national spheres to fight a global war. 
Third, the war approach is undermined all efforts to win over Muslim hearts and 
minds. Al-Qaeda is no longer just an organization. Thanks to the war on terrorism, it has 
grown into movement commanded by ideology, philosophy, and ideas that revolve 
around Islam and Muslims as the real target of the war on terrorism. Bullets and B52’s 
cannot battle such ideas. On the contrary, the excessive usage of military means leads to a 
great number of killings and does not discriminate between innocent civilians and 
terrorists. This provides no chance to win the war against al-Qaeda. The U.S. has lost the 
“war of idea” on all fronts. This is apparent in the way that people see Bin Laden and 
how they perceive the west in general and the United States in particular. According to a 
2007 opinion poll taken in four Muslim countries (morocco, Pakistan, Egypt, and 
Indonesia), an average of 34 percent of respondents perceived that the goal of the war on 
terrorism was to weaken and divide Islam. In addition, 36 percent felt the aim was to 






viewed the U.S. war on terrorism as an act of protection from terrorist attacks.  
Additionally, on average, 19 percent had negative feelings about Bin Laden and 69 
percent agreed with his organization’s goals.188  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The war approach has not solved the problem of terrorism, In fact, terrorism as a 
phenomenon will never be eliminated. There can be no single moment when the U.S. 
administration will declare the end of terrorism. Terrorism has existed for thousands of 
years, and it will remain until the Day of Judgment. The elimination of all terrorists as the 
primary goal of the war on terrorism is problematic, because such a goal is unrealistic and 
unachievable Policies should focus on how to minimize its effects, how to make it less 
attractive to individuals, and how to live with it while preserving the fundamentals of 
democracy. The following recommendations are not silver bullets that will eliminate 
terrorism. However, segregation and the adoption of a hybrid approach are the keys to 
minimize terrorism and to bring it back to a national level. 
As a starting point, two key steps can make these recommendations applicable 
and successful. First, the U.S. administration has to redefine terrorism and terrorists.  
There is no single satisfactory definition for the word terrorism. According to Laqueur, 
there are more than a hundred different definitions for terrorism.189 The lack of 
international consensus about what constitutes terrorism makes the U.S. war on terrorism 
an example of political hypocrisy. The term becomes elastic, assigned to those who 
disagree with the U.S. policies or threaten its interests. 
If terrorism has one clear definition and the U.S. administration wants to eliminate 
it altogether, one might ask, why U.S. B52s do not hover over Uganda to eliminate the 
Lord Resistance Army. This group has killed far more people in Africa many times more 
than al-Qaeda ever did. They have abducted 20,000 children for sex and military service, 
                                                 
188 Steven Kull and others, “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al 
Qaeda,” World Public Opinion, April 24, 2007, 6–16, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/346.php, (accessed November 16, 
2010).  
189 Walter Laqueur, the new Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 5.  
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and they have displaced about two million people.190 Additionally, like al-Qaeda, 
religious ideology drives the group. It is a transnational terrorist group operating in 
several African countries whose goal is the establishment of a Christian state based on the 
biblical 10 commitments. There are dozens of terrorist groups operating around the globe. 
Selectively using military force against Islamic groups, as to element every terrorist  and 
not against others legitimizes the al-Qaeda’s notion that the war is purely against Islam 
and Muslims.  
Second, the administration has to admit that military force is not the right tool to 
eliminate terrorism. On the contrary, the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq 
complicates the problem. U.S. military forces are skilled at fighting large regular armies, 
commanded by a state on battlefronts.  However, they are not prepared to fight loosely 
organized criminals.  The extensive use of military power affects civilians in Afghanistan 
and Iraq more than it affects terrorists. Accordingly, the massive killings produced by 
bombardments raise anti-America resentments and facilitate terrorism recruitment. 
Therefore, without building an internationally recognized definition of terrorism and 
admitting military force cannot solve the problem, the following recommendations will 
not work.  
1. Segregation  
Terrorists are not all the same; therefore, putting all terrorists into one category 
complicates the problem. The U.S. administration should change its rhetoric from the 
“war on terrorism,” at least, to the “war on al-Qaeda,” although the word “War” is also 
problematic. The total war strategy against all Islamic terrorists has been 
counterproductive, as it led them to unify. Before 9/11, terrorist groups in the Islamic 
world were at odds with Bin Laden and his desire to fight the far enemy. However, after 
the U.S. declared a war on terrorism, an alliance among them served their best interests. 
Therefore, the U.S. policies should aim to make it better for those who are not-al-Qaeda 
to dissociate themselves from the group. One suggestion in this context is to rephrase 
                                                 
190 Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War on Terrorism" "Capacity 
Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa (United States: U.S. Army 
War College, 2007), 23. 
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President Bush’s rhetoric from ‘if you are not with us, you are with terrorists’ to ‘if you 
are not with al-Qaeda, we are not against you‘. Such policies, if applied patiently with 
limited military operations, will isolate al-Qaeda from its affiliates, especially in North 
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq.  
Additionally, the U.S. administration should differentiate between al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and between al-Qaeda and the different nationalist-resistance 
movements in Iraq.  The Taliban and Iraqi nationalist goals are totally different from al-
Qaeda’s. These movements seek to regain their lost power in their respective countries, 
while al-Qaeda seeks to establish a utopian theological state. Therefore, negotiating a 
political settlement with the Taliban and the Iraqi nationalists in their respective states 
will neutralize them and isolate al-Qaeda.  
According to an analytical study that covers 648 terrorist groups from 1968 to 
2006, Jones Seth, argues, “When terrorist group becomes involved in an insurgency, it 
does not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by negotiating a 
settlement with the government; 25 percent of the time, they achieved victory; and 19 
percent of the time, military forces defeated them.”191With that said, al-Qaeda, unlike the 
surveyed religious groups, has a greater chance to achieve victory. It is the most 
sophisticated organization ever, and it operates beyond a state borders. Therefore, 
political negotiations with other national resistance movements and the exclusion of the 
non-al-Qaeda terrorist groups from military operations are essential to eliminate al-
Qaeda.    
2. Hybrid Approach 
There is no single approach to eliminate al-Qaeda or solve the problem of 
terrorism. However, each organization should have a distinct set of policies that fit with 
its goals, ideology, motivations, and constituencies. In al-Qaeda’s case, the U.S. 
administration should focus on the long-term policies oriented toward rooting out the 
ideas and causes behind Islamic extremism. The administration should also keep 
terrorism under the umbrella of criminology and handle perpetrators according to the 
                                                 
191 Seth, How Terrorist Groups End, 111. 
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legal system. In terms of a military approach, the U.S. administration should avoid the 
over usage of military power. Instead, it should utilize surgical military operations against 
very specific targets, which will minimize the possibility of civilian casualties.    
a. Root-Causes Approach 
Killing Bin Laden or other al-Qaeda operatives is not going to solve the 
problem of terrorism. Al-Qaeda has become more an idea than an organization, and the 
U.S. cannot confront this “idea” militarily. Therefore, the U.S. administration should 
reallocate its resources to destroy the idea behind terrorism, instead of spending its 
billions on pursuing, killing, or capturing individuals.  The death of an individual can 
become the impetus for others to pick up a weapon and fight. The U.S. policies should 
not focus on killing hundreds of terrorists, while neglecting the millions of young 
Muslims who lean toward extremism as a reaction to biased American foreign policies.  
In a nutshell, three main root-causes spur extremism in the Islamic world. 
First, biased American foreign policy regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict constitutes 
the cornerstone of Islamic frustration. An unwillingness to solve this conflict and push 
the peace process forward puts U.S. credibility on the line. Additionally, its unconditional 
financial and military support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians fosters 
extremism and raises hatred against the United States. Therefore, the U.S. administration 
should seriously address this problem and show its willingness to solve this conflict with 
a “two states solution”.   
Second, the extensive presence of the U.S. military forces in the Middle 
East, especially after the unjustified invasion of Iraq, has sparked waves of anti-American 
sentiments. As Secunda and Terence argue, “In seeking to sell a war against terrorism to 
the American people, the Bush administration seems to have sold Islamic Jihadism to 
entire Muslim World.”192 Therefore, the U.S. administration should limit its military 
operations in the region to avoid the perceptions of political and military domination.  
                                                 
192 Eugene Secunda and Terence Moran, Selling War to America: From the Spanish American War to 
the Global War on Terror, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 176. 
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Third, the U.S. administration should promote democratization in the 
region, without undermining it. If the Islamic public chooses an Islamic government to 
represent them, the U.S. has to work with that government.  The U.S. response to 
HAMAS implies that democracy is conditional. In other words, democracy does not 
apply to Islamic parties. The U.S. policy fails to reconcile the need for democracy in the 
Middle East and the fear of Islamic parties assuming power. The U.S. administration falls 
between the hammer and the anvil on this issue; that is, between their need for the 
regimes’ support in the U.S. war on terrorism and the Islamists who opposed their 
military presence in the region. Yet, to improve its image in the Islamic world, the U.S. 
administration has to make this difficult choice. Accordingly, it has to build relations 
with whatever representatives the public elects, and view the relationships as a 
partnership 
b. Soft Power Approach  
Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion.”193 The U.S. administration displayed a lack of 
appreciation for possible long-term advantages by ignoring the use of a soft power 
approach against terrorism. Apparently, this methodology seems paradoxical to military 
operational strategy. Therefore, it’s not surprising that former Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld did not know the meaning of this term. In 2003, he made no distinction 
between soft power and hard power, and he limited soft power’s meaning to the role of 
diplomacy.194 
Terrorism is a crime, and terrorists are criminals, therefore, police, 
intelligence agencies, and the court system are the main instruments for eliminating 
terrorism. Unlike the military approach, policing terrorism is more productive, because 
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police operations guarantee both disruption of terrorists and public contentment. Using 
police and law-enforcement agencies to counter al-Qaeda does not allow for heroic 
narrations that attract Muslim youths. The idea of being holy warriors who fight against 
the crusades is a keystone of al-Qaeda’s recruitment. Policing can stand against such 
recruitment propaganda, undermine al-Qaeda narration, and take the glory and the thrill 
out of terrorism.195 
Al-Qaeda is a transitional and cross-border phenomena; it is an 
international problem, not just an American problem. Therefore, its solution should rely 
on conceptualization of the problem at the international level. Militarizing the 
international community against this phenomenon is almost impossible. Instead, the U.S. 
administration should advocate an international court system dedicated to terrorism. Such 
a policy would enhance international cooperation and build a consensus around the 
meaning of terrorism and the proper methods to counter it. Additionally, a response to 
terrorism at the international level will reduce anti-American resentment and undermine 
al-Qaeda’s “crusade narrations”. 
c. Military Approach 
The use of military force to fight al-Qaeda should be limited to surgical 
operations conducted by vanguard units. Such units should be tasked to find, fix, and 
disrupt the terrorists’ military capabilities, without the need for an excessive preliminary 
bombardment or the need to hold ground for long period. Units could coordinate these 
missions with host nations who understand the local language, as well as the cultural and 
religious implications of these operations. Forces should not measure success by the 
number of terrorists killed, but instead by how many civilians the operation has saved. 
The administration should consider a compensation program for those who lost relatives 
or belongings as consequence of military operations.  Such policies carry a built-in 
message that Muslim public is not the enemy. This will undermine al-Qaeda claims that 
the west does not value the lives of Muslims.   
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Al-Qaeda exists, for the most part, in the Islamic world. Therefore, 
approaching it with an Islamic perspective, either militarily or politically, will be more 
effective than the direct U.S. military intervention. However, the U.S. administration can 
provide countries’ of the region funds, equipment, training, and intelligence.  
Al-Qaeda, as a religious cult with a utopian goal, faced dissolution from 
within. The overreaction to the 9/11 atrocity, in terms of excessive usage of the U.S. 
military machines against Muslim countries, reversed al-Qaeda’s impending failure. 
Before the war on terrorism, al-Qaeda was an isolated group in Afghanistan with limited 
number of members. Other jihadists groups in Afghanistan were at odds with Bin Laden 
and his organization. The U.S. total war approach against terrorism led other jihadists to 
fight with Bin Laden.  
This research examined the effectiveness of the war on terrorism 9 years 
after its declaration.  The organizational structure metrics offers a better understanding of 
to what extent the war achieved its goal to eliminate terrorism.  The analysis determined 
that the war approach has fueled terrorism. It contributed to the horizontal expansion of 
al-Qaeda’s organizational structure. Al-Qaeda’s expansion and survival relies on the idea 
that Muslims are under a crusade attack. Apparently, until policy decisions invalidate this 
narration, victory will be hard to achieve.   
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